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Cover: John August Swanson, b. 1938,
American. The Fisherman, 1990, acrylic on
canvas, 4 feet x 7 feet. Private Collection.

An exhibition of john August Swanson's work
has been shown during the month of April in the
VU Student Union. The exhibit is sponsored
jointly by The Cresset, the Liturgical Institute,
and Bergsma Galleries, Grand Rapids,
Michigan. Mr. Swanson is a speaker at the
1992 Institute of Liturgical Studies and Church
Music Seminar, held 28-30 April.

The Cresset

INLUCETUA
The Nets Are Breaking! The Nets Are Breaking!
This month's cover reproduces a painting by John
August Swanson, and brings up into our attention the story
of the miraculous draught of fishes, as it used to be called
in the old days. The painting barely contains the fish, who
seem to desire to leap out of the constraints of the flat
surface. They curve and splash and dart before our eyes,
the quicksilver of their motion translated into a dozen
different colors. Looking at the fish, and at the four
puzzled fishermen, I am drawn back into a question that
has been uppermost on many campus minds during these
weeks: How can we be diverse and be ourselves?
The story in the gospel, at least as John tells it, brings
up a number of issues. But it is certainly about what to do
with "too many." Here, after a night of nothing, they catch
so many fish that the nets almost break, or "tantos peces
que las redes casi se rompfan," as Swanson's border says.
The fishermen in the painting reflect several possible
responses to this phenomenon; I can hear the sermon
series now. On the far right the First man is earnest-to
me he looks tired. He seems to be looking at the fish, but
seeing little. Only his fingertips touch the net's edge. In
fact, he seems little affected, even by the wind, unlike
Fisherman Two, whose hair blows out wildly. This man's
eyes are wide; the whites show us that he is astonished. He
looks down-whether at fish or nets-engaged and intent,
and his hands are in the nets up to his wrists. The Third
Fisherman looks out at us, direct and straight-ahead.
Could he be the figure who represents John? He is in
contact with the observers, as much conscious of the
outside of the scene as we are. And the Fourth, the
helmsman? He really looks exhausted, all in, ready for the
end of this experience, however miraculous.
Well, what is the story for? It surely has something to
do with our fears about nets breaking. John's account, in
an odd Iitle detail, tells us that the net was full of one
hundred and fifty-three fish. Why? Fred Niedner tells me
that this was the number of known species of fish in the
Galilean world, and so that the number represents
inclusiveness. The net takes in all that we know-and it
does not break.
Wrestling with plurality has almost replaced baseball
Aprill992

as the great American game. We sought plurality (in some
sense), we prided ourselves on it (at moments), we
celebrated it (at least on monuments) and we thought we
meant it. In the church, we have said that we want to
include every kind of believer, every kind of person with
the desire for faith. Diversity is good; more diversity is
better. We have deferred until another time the question
of how much diversity is possible, of how many everybodies
we mean.
But moments of
crisis, or even moments of decision-making, force us to do
more than nod in solemn agreement that the questions are
important. We may even have to vote. Can we include so
much of the Other that there ceases to be an other because
there is no integrity to the element against which it is
defined? Many of our institutions face exactly this
decision, in terms of real hiring of real people. And the
questions, posed in terms of real people, are filled with real
pain.
It is good then, to be reminded about nets. There is,
in this story at least, an assurance that nets cast widely out
on the basis of Jesus' command will hold. Such a reading
insists that we be serious about the basis on which we desire
inclusiveness or plurality or diversity. If we desire these
things so that we photograph well, or so that we will catch a
trend, or so that we will foster our own sense of superiority,
then at some point we will rightly fear "Too many!" But if
we are, as Christians, going about our true work, patiently
feeding and gathering, then the nets will hold. And if
we're lucky, there will even be breakfast on the beach.

a
We've had a good deal of correspondence this month
reacting to Ed Byrne's column in the March issue
concerning feminism and film. Ed has answered at least
some of this mail, but what was addressed to me deserves
some answer here. I did not agree with the sentiments in
Byrne's column. I do not believe that feminism fails to
represent what most women in this culture want for
themselves and their society. But The Cresset is, after all, a
journal of opinion. As its editor, I choose some things,
3

encourage writers to take up topics they have told me are
on their minds, nudge them in directions I think are
helpful or persuasive-and then I work on things like the
placement of articles, the setting up and punctuation of
poems, checking spelling, and arguing with the post office
over labels. In this space I write my opinions, and, having
chosen a columnist, I let him make his own mistakes or
triumphs in his own space. I reject utterly the idea that The
Cresset is discredited because I chose to print an article
whose position I personally disavow. Though Professor
Byrne's piece would not perhaps satisfy every possible
criterion for opinion writing, and I think it could be
debated whether or not he fairly represented the opposing
positions, his subject is one about which there can be
considerable disagreement, even among people of good
will. And no one could remain an editor without believing
that the phrase "people of good will" described her
readers--most of the time.

This issue brings to a close another year of Cressets.
Thinking about art, and a number of art forms, has given
rise to most of the writing here, and we trust that many of
you will find these comments compelling. The prospect of
summer advances, and though people in the professoriate
no longer enjoy the halcyon days of ease immortalized in
The Professor's House, Willa Cather's beautiful novel with an
academic hero, we do look forward to longer periods of
reading, and a reasonable amount of staring out over the
waters of Lake Michigan. We will plan a new course, and
think about what should be in The Cresset next year.
Readers with ideas on this subject should write to the
editor, who promises not to lose letters while climbing sand
dunes.
Peace,
GME

0

Near One Historical Site
The forest should fill with proper nouns,
History walk forward with its hands up,
But I am so ignorant of names
I think it arms them. These leaves, those stems,
The generals and lieutenants are words
Which slur in a Doppler drift of wind.
For a moment, my son skids, stops, wavers
In the shale, astonished as the newly
Wounded. He demands the right way up
This cliffside, the locations where stone
Sits firm. His drummer-boy face might be
Following a flag towards cannons while
The pines retreat, the bushes squat, and we
Balance above a battlefield, foolish
Snipers believing the war so distant
Everything red oozes into the earth
And the trees until the forest turns
A garish, odd, deliberate green.

Gary Fincke
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On the Day of Pentecost
for Calvin Henry Francis, Sr.

Down Westchester Avenue he tramps
Following the tracks of the el
Through the broken borough,
Trains thundering overhead
Like the sound of a mighty wind.
A new kind of Francis, this Francis,
Far from the fields of Assisi,
Far from the flow of nature's beauty
Where birds and moon are family.
He walks with a flame of fire on his head,
The red wool cap pulled over his right ear,
Greeting confused people on the street
In slurred speech, each in native tongue:
Shalom aleichem! Buenos dias! Griiss Gott!
As if he were chief host at Ellis Island
Welcoming novices into the new world.
Hardly anyone notices anymore
As he shuffles from block to block,
Singing "Glory, Glory, Alleluia!"
Stopping to pick up a coded message
On a discarded candy wrapper or match folder
Announcing cryptically an apocalyptic end;
Picking a rose-"Yellow for the Holy Spirit;"
Smoothing out a piece of tinfoil"God shine on you and your family."
Losing teeth, losing strength, losing time,
He plods down streets seeking a son or daughter,
Mother or father, human arms
To grasp, to clasp him in comfort and warmth
Removing the chill of lonely hallway nights,
Providing a household believing he is who he is,
Not drunk or drugged, but dreaming
Dreams belonging to old men.
Only phantom folds, not earthly embrace,
Cradle him, guard him, throw him
At the altar prostrate
Where, like home, without shoes, without shame,
Known beneath all knowing,
Drawn yet dreading to such holiness
He hears the gifting-gifted voices
Of angels singing in clear harmony:
"For he's a jolly good fellow."

Fritz Fritsche!
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The Code
There were three in the meadow by the brook
Gathering up windrows, piling coclrs of hay,
With an eye always lifted toward the west
Where an irregular sun-lxmlered cloud
Darlrly advanced with a perpetual dagger
Fliclrering across its bosom. Suddenly
One helper, thrusting pitchfork in the ground,
Marched himself off the field and home. One stayed.
The town-bred farmer Jailed to understand.
'What is there wrong 7'
'Something you just no~ said'
'What did I say7'
~bout our taking pains. '
To cock the hay 7- because it's going to shower7
I said that mlm! than half an hour ago.
I said it to myself as much as you. '
'You didn't know. But james is one bigfool.
He thought you meant to find fault with his work.
That's what the average farmer would have meant.
James would take time, of course, to chew it over
Before he acted: he's just got round to act.,
'He is a fool if that's the way he takes me. '

'Don't let it bother you. You'vefound out something.
The hand that knows his business won't be told
To do work better or faster-those two things.
I'm as particular as anyone:
Most likely I'd have served you just the same.
But I know you don't understand our ways.
You were just talking what was in your mind.
What was in all our minds, and you weren't hinting.
Tell you a story of what happened once:
I was up here in Salem at a man's
Named Sanders with a gang ofJour or[roe
Doing the haying. No one liked the boss.
He was one of the kind sports call a spider,
All wiry arms and legs that spread out wavy
From a humped body nigh as big's a biscuit
But work! that man could work, especially
If by so doing he could get more work
Out of his hired help.· I'm not denying
He was hard on himself I couldn't find
That he lu!pt any hours-not for himself
Daylight and lantern-light were one to him:
I've heard him pounding in the barn all night.
But what he liked was someone to encourage.
Them that he couldn't lead he'd get behind
And drive, the way you can, you know, in mowingKeep at their heels and threaten to mow their legs off.
I'd seen about enough of his hulling triclrs
(We call that hulling). I'd been watching him.
So when he paired off with me in the hayfzeld

ROBERT FROST'S "THE CODE": A CONTEXT AND A COMMENTARY
John Feaster
I

In October of 1900, Robert Frost, his wife Elinor, and
their daughter Leslie took up residence at Derry Farm near
Derry Village in New Hampshire. The farm had been
purchased for Frost (though he was not to own it outright
until 1911, when he promptly sold it) by his paternal
grandfather, William Prescott Frost, who had also
arranged, without consulting Robert in the matter, for a
hired man in the person of one Carl Burell, a long-time
friend of Frost's, an amateur poet, an enthusiastic botanist,
John Feaster is a professor ofEnglish at VU. In a long career, he
has taught hundreds of works, but has newly re-discovered an
engagement with the works of early twentieth century American
writers. His essay on Stephen Crane will appear this summer in
American Literary Realism. The pressent essay is part of a
longer study ofFrost's treatment of the subject of work.
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and, most important from an altogether practical
standpoint, someone considerably more experienced than
was Frost in the practical matter of eking a living out of a
rocky farm in southern New Hampshire.
The perfectly sensible nature of these arrangements
notwithstanding, Frost, according to his biographer,
Lawrance Thompson, was "furious" that his grandfather
and Burell had devised them without consulting him. His
resentment was made all the greater, Thompson goes on to
report, because even though Carl Burell was "a good
friend, a hard worker, a conscientious human being, ...
ever since high school days he had treated Rob solicitously,
as though Rob didn't even know how to sharpen a pencil.
Now he joined in a 'conspiracy' with Rob's grandfather
without even asking the person most concerned. 'I take a
long time to wreak vengeance, when I've been wronged,'
Frost later said of this arrangement, 'but I never forget, and
I never forgive a wrong'" (26~).
The Cresset

To load the load, thinlts I, Look out for trouble.
I built the load and tapped it off; old Sanders
Combed it doum with a rake and says,
K"
Everything went well till we reached the bam
With a big jag to empty in a bay.
You understand that meant the easy job
For the man up on top of throwing down
The hay and rolling it off wholesale,
Where on a mow it would have been slow lifting.
You wouldn't thinJr. afellow'd nud much urging
Under those circumstances, would you now7
But the old fool seizes his fork in both hands,
And looking up bewhiskered out of the pit,
Shouts like an army captain, •Let her come!"
Thinks I, D'ye mean it7 ·~at was that you said?"
I asked out loud, so's there'd be no mistake,
•Did you say, Let her come7" •Yes, let her come."
He said it O'VeT, but he said it softer.
Never you say a thing like that to a man,
Not if he values what he is. God, I'd as soon
Murdered him as left out his middle name.
I'd built the load and knew right where to find it.
Two or three furltfuls I picked lightly round for
Like meditating, and then I just dug in
And dumped the rackful on him in ten lots.
I looked O'VeT the side once in the dust
And caught sight of him treading-water-like,
Keeping his head above, •Damn ye, "I says,
•That gets ye!" He squeaked like a squeezed rat.
That was the last I saw or heard of him.
I cleaned the rack and drove out to cool off.
As I sat mopping hayseed from my neclc,
And sort of waiting to be asked about it,
One of the buys sings out, •Where's the old man 7"
•J left him in the bam under the hay.
Ifye want him, ye can go dig him out. "

They realized from the way I swabbed my neck
More than was needed something must be up.
They headed for the bam; I stayed where I was.
They told me afterward. First they furlted hay,
A lot of it, out into the bam floor.
Nothing! They listened for him. Not a rustle.
I guess they thought I'd spiked him in the temple
Before I buried him, or I couldn't have managed.
They excavated more.
keep his wife
Out of the bam. "Someone looked in a window,
And curse me if he wasn't in the kitchen
Slumped way doum in a chair, with both his feet
Against the stove, the hottest day that summer.
He looked so clean disgusted from behind
There was no one that dared to stir him up,
Or let him know that he was being looked at.
Apparently I hadn't buried him
(I may have knocked him doum); but my just trying
To bury him had hurt his dignity.
He had gone to the house so's not to meet me.
He kept away from us all afternoon.
We tended to his hay. We saw him out
After a while picking peas in his garden:
He couldn't keep away from doing something. '

That Frost found Burell's presence at Derry Farm an
irksome reminder of his own incompetence as a farmer
appears to be substantiated by the fact that he seized on
the earliest opportunity, and the slimmest of pretexts,
for pressuring Burell to leave: Carl was off working for
the local road commissioner when he should have been
working on the farm; Carl dido 't strain the milk properly;
Carl pruned the fruit trees the wrong way (Thompson 277).
What had been a long-time friendship between Frost and
Burell, in short, thoroughly degenerated once it was
transformed from a relationship between "just friends" into
the more stressful terms of owner vs. worker.
I don't intend to read some deep psychological
significance into the troubled relationship between Frost
and Burell. I do want to suggest, however, that their
relationship offers an interesting example from Frost's early
life of an ownership vs. labor conflict that was eventually to
become commonplace in his art, a conflict nowhere more

pronounced, nor more equivocally resolved, than in the
poem reproduced above, "The Code." I should say at the
outset that in what follows I have no wish to depreciate the
role of the formative imagination in Frost's poetry. What I
do hope to do is to make some modest suggestions about
the working of that imagination in relation to common
anxieties informing the culture in which Frost wrote.

·o.
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'Weren't you relieved to find he wasn't dead?'
'No! and yet I don't know-it's hard to say.
I went about to kill him fair enough. '
'You took an awkward way. Did he discharge you 7'
'Discharge me7 No! He knew I did just right.'

Robert Frost

II
Because Frost was a self-proclaimed partisan of the
"traditional values" it would seem to follow that whenever he
touched on the subject of work he was an uncomplicated
and enthusiastic supporter of the idea that being a hard
worker is a matter not just of economic necessity but of
moral obligation. To think of hard work and moral virtue
going hand in hand is of course a fundamental precept of a
work ethic as handed down from a Protestant past and as

7

conventionally articulated by late 19th and early 20thcentury moralists. Difficult and wearisome physical labor,
as Daniel T. Rodgers has summarized these views in his The
Worlt Ethic in Industrial America: 1850-1920, "was the core of
the moral life. Work made men useful in a world of
economic scarcity; it staved off the doubts and temptations
that prey on idleness; it opened the way to deserved wealth
and status; it allowed one to put the impress of mind and
skill on the material world" ( 14) . Virtually all of these
presumably beneficial properties of work are treated
somewhere in Frost's considerable body of poetry. Some of
his better-known poems (one thinks immediately of such
obvious examples as "Mowing," "The Tuft of Flowers,"
"Mter Apple Picking," "Mending Wall," "Two Tramps in
Mud Time," and "Birches") feature characters for whom
physical labor, either factually or figuratively, constitutes
the essential terms of their moral reflection and humane
worth. On the most accessible material level, and in
severely practical and well-worn terms, diligent laborers are
worthy of their hire, whether real or only figurative, and
hard work is both a measure and a metaphor of the life
well lived. In more abstract terms, work is a powerful
creative/interpretetive activity, providing a joyous and selfreflexive occasion to make some kind of conceptual sense
out of material actualities-the "weight and strength" of the
physical world, as Frost writes in "To Earthward."
It has often been observed that the remarkable
length of Frost's poetic career placed him historically in
relation to an exceptionally broad range of literary
influences. There has been little corollary
acknowledgement, however, that the remarkable length of
his career placed Frost in relation to a period of practically
revolutionary change in the organization of American
society. As Rodgers and others have recently confirmed, a
particularly noteworthy aspect of this change had to do
with the role of work as a critically-positioned meeting
place between "fact and value." Even as Frost implicitly
and others explicitly could extol the abstract moral values
of the work ethic, they could hardly ignore the socioeconomic facts that in the industrial North-and, more
pertinent in Frost's case, in the hard-scrabble rural
Northeast-physical labor was often neither joyful nor
conducive to moral development. In the rise of
mechanization and the institutionalized factory system,
indeed in the whole complex process of what Alan
Trachtenberg has referred to as "the incorporation of
America," labor was more often a mind-and body-numbing
experience for the average worker than an occasion for
peaceful, character-forming reflection. More often than
not, the workplace was the place of conflict rather than the
place where conflict was resolved.
It seems natural to suppose that such themes could be
treated more effectively in industrial settings than in the
rural settings common in Frost's poetry. However, in tumof-the-century America the complex debate surrounding
the subject of work was not confined to the factory
8

environment and it is certainly not confined to that
environment in Frost's poetry. It must be remembered
that in 1900 the rural population (sixty percent) of the
United States outstripped urban population (forty percent)
by nearly fifteen million (Douglas 183). It could be
argued, and of course frequently was, that the concerns of
farm owners and laborers therefore had an even more
pressing claim for attention than the concerns of the
largely urban factory system. Frost does at least twice deal
at some length with the subject of the factory worker (in
"The Self-Seeker" and "The Lone Striker") but he more
characteristically transports his capital/labor concerns into
a countrified setting that may be rural but is rarely pastoral
in the standard sense of that term-certainly not "an
enamelled world" of "untroubled rural delight and peace,"
as Raymond Williams has described the content of the
classic pastoral form (18). Williams' term "counterpastoral" therefore seems an altogether more appropriate
descriptor of that oppressive world Frost frequently renders
in his narratives of rural working life. Frost's realist
temperament often leads him to depict situations in which
the implied existence of a wholesome labor ideal
encounters unwelcome and stubborn resistance from a
deeper, more objective recognition of the enervating
circumstances in which labor all too often occurs.
These circumstances were brought about, as Frost
perceived (with some measure of reluctance), by
fundamental transformations in the nature of capitalism in
late 19th and early 20th century America. Moreover,
Frost's sometimes conflicted attitudes towards the related
subjects of capital, ownership, and labor were certainly not
unique. On the contrary, his attitudes reflect widespread
anxieties towards these culture-defining subjects, anxieties
fueled by perceptions that evolution towards a massproduction, mass-consumption society was rapidly
changing the face of capitalism and changing it for the
worse. In The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Daniel
Bell describes these critical changes as follows:
In the early development of capitalism, the unrestrained
economic impulse was held in check by Puritan restraint and the
Protestant ethic. One worked because of one's obligation to
one's calling, or to fulfill the covenant of the community. But the
Protestant ethic was undermined not by modernism but by
capitalism itself. ... The Protestant ethic" .... had worked to
limit sumptuary (though not capital) accumulation. When the
Protestant ethic was sundered from bourgeois society, only the
hedonism remained, and the capitalist system lost its
transcendental ethic. (21)
No longer informed by "transcendental ties" or
assumptions of "ultimate meaning," working relationships,
in the period of transition between an "old" and a "new"
capitalism, were rapidly being redefined in terms of
efficient productivity and what Rodgers has called a "profitmaximizing mentality" (53), a redefinition that almost
inevitably resulted in a disharmony of interests between
The Cresset

owners and their laboring force. It is precisely this conflict,
I will argue in what follows, that Frost dramatically renders
in "The Code."

III
"The Code" opens harmoniously enough, with three
men (an owner and two hired hands) working busily
together to put up the hay before the storm approaching
from the west arrives to ruin it. Shortly, however, this
idyllic scene of cooperative industry is interrupted by the
departure of one of the two hired hands, who walks off the
job upset that the owner, a "town-bred farmer," has mildly
hinted that he might work a little more quickly and
efficiently. The hired hand who remains behind
thereupon patiently explains that James has taken these
hints as an insult: "'The hand that knows his business won't
be told to do work better or faster.'" In pushing James to
work harder, the owner-farmer has inadvertently violated
an unspoken free-labor code of behavior by which workers
retain their dignity by at least appearing to be what they
almost certainly were not in fact: totally free, sovereign, and
self-determined individuals and not mere hirelings or
wage-slaves. In its earlier conceptions, the "strike," as
Trachtenberg has observed (and that is what James is
doing, striking), "represented a defiance of the cardinal
norm of everyday [working] life: compliance with the
authority of employers" (89). The second worker, who
characterizes the now-departed James as "'one big fool,'"
now proceeds to tell an elaborate story of how he once
dealt with a contentious owner who attempted to introduce
principles of "scientific management," the industryapproved circumlocution for what appears in the poem as
"hulling."
This lack of sympathy on behalf of one worker for
the other is worth dwelling on here, if only briefly. "'Most
likely I'd have served you just the same,'" he says, but "'I
know you don't understand our ways.'" This is a
commendable sentiment, but it seems directly antithetical
to what David Montgomery has described as a "spirit of
mutuality" among skilled workers (and here skill amounts
to "cocking hay" properly), who normally band together,
or strike together, to ensure that in the face of the
demands of scientific management to perform more
efficiently they maintain control over their own work
routine and pace: "Technical knowledge acquired on the
job was embedded in a mutualistic ethical code, also
acquired on the job, and together these attributes provided
skilled workers with considerable autonomy at their work
and powers of resistance to the wishes of their employers"
(qtd. by Trachtenberg 92). Why the second worker (1)
chooses not to walk off the job, but (2) decides instead to
stay behind and tell his didactic tale, and why he (3) calls
his fellow-worker a "fool" are problems we will eventually
have to deal with.
At first blush the poem (with this second worker 's
May 1992

lesson in violence at the heart of it) seems little more than
a laborer's tall-tale filled with the kind of humorous egoembellishments that we might naturally expect from such
tales. But the deceptively comic surface of the poem fails
to conceal an underlying current of deep hostility between
ownership and labor, and one can hardly fail to be
impressed by how far Frost has come from the '"Men work
together,' I told him from the heart, I 'Whether they work
together or apart'" sentiments of his earlier poem "A Tuft
of Flowers." Men may work together, in "The Code," but
they are certainly far apart in terms of latent class enmity,
as abundantly illustrated by the hired hand's exaggerated,
but no less illuminating, account of his attempt to murder
his "bullish," slave-driving employer by burying him under
a load of hay.
"Weren't you relieved to find he wasn't dead 7"
"No! and yet I don't know-it's hard to say.
I went about to kill him fair enough. "

What combination of cultural circumstances,
frustrations, and imagined wrongs, it seems fair to ask,
could have produced this heightened animosity? It is worth
noting, in this context, that recent historical studies of the
relationships between economy and culture in the rural
Northeast have begun tocenter on refashioning our
understanding of rural class conflict, or what Christopher
Clark has referred to, perhaps somewhat euphemistically,
as "the structures of opportunity in rural society." These
efforts, for Clark, need to take into account the ways in
which such material circumstances as "demography,
property-holding, wealth-distribution and life-cycle effects"
interact with such social circumstances as "cultural,
ideological, and behavioral patterns, including what Uames
A.] Henretta called mentalitis" (286). In his classic The
Sociology of Rural Life, T. Lynn Smith is more helpfully
direct in describing the typical situation of farm laborers
and the kind of material and social circumstances that
defined their status:
In family farm areas the agricultural ladder is in operation,
functioning as a social elevator to lift persons from the status of
farm laborers, through the various grades of tenants, into the
ownership and possession of the land they till. In such sections
there is little that savors of the closed class
system, little to
array the classes against one another.
But the situation is very different where there is
concentration of ownership in the hands of a few. In this case the
great mass of cultivators lack the security that comes with
ownership of the soil. Vertical mobility is practically impossible;
only a few can ever hope for the ownership of land; and the great
masses are doomed to the permanent status of farm laborers.
Inevitably this means a closed class system. It contains all the
elements necessary for class struggle. (472)
The situation Smith describes m his second
paragraph brings to mind yet another of Frost's economic
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casualties, the dying (and eventually dead) hired man,
Silas, in "The Death of the Hired Man." As Mary says of
him in that poem:

"... Nothing to loolr. baclr.ward to with pride,
And nothing to loolr. forward to with hope,
So now and never any different. "
Though Frost does not establish their precise
demographic situation in "The Code," I think it reasonable
to assume that he intends the workers here to be no
different from Silas. Like him, they are locked into a
capital/labor class division with little hope of ever
extricating themselves from it. Upward economic mobility
may be a theoretical possibility for them but it remains
fantastically improbable. Far more likely, in Smith's words,
they are "doomed to the permanent status of farm
laborers."
But if it is indeed class struggle Frost is portraying in
"The Code," it is class struggle of a curiously repressed
kind. Why, if that is what it is, does the second hired hand
not join his comrade, James, in walking off the job? Why
does the second hired hand instead take such pains to
instruct his employer in the protocol of labor relations?
And why, at the heart of his instruction, has he placed such
a violent exemplum? I suggest that Frost's dramatic display
of conflict in "The Code" reveals his own deeply-divided
attitudes and uncertainties in respect to the sometimes
irreconcilable claims of ownership over against labor,
economic progress over against personal dignity, the
demands of cooperative productivity over against the
demands of a laissez-faire individualism. The second hired
hand operates in situ as the conservative Frost's cynicallywise spokesman, one who acknowledges the divisiveness of
class but recognizes as well that the code functions in a
larger, systemic way to acknowledge, formalize, and defuse
what would otherwise be a paralyzing and, to say the least,
economically disadvantageous opposition between owner
and laborer.
James's "foolish" strike and the central narrator's own
violent assault of his former employer ("'I'd as soon I
Murdered him as left out his middle name.'") are best
understood as extreme representations of what can occur if
the code is not mutually observed. Even more to the
somewhat didactic point of the poem, these incidents
represent what must not be allowed to happen if the
"system," whatever its imperfections, is to endure, a
compromising sentiment that Frost would have found it
difficult to reject out of hand. Just by giving the merest
appearance of finding fault with one of his workers, the
owner has violated that fragile behavioral ecology in which
the opposing claims of ownership and labor, profit and
dignity, achieve an efficient, productive, and systemperpetuating equilibrium.
The code in effect
institutionalizes moral ambiguity, and openly acknowledges
the absolute necessity of a functional class division, in such
a way that expected and even legitimate capital/labor
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conflict is, at least when the code is mutually observed,
thoroughly suppressed. By elaborately masking conflict
behind a facade of acceptable "ethical" behavior, the code
insures a provisional, if deceptive, compatibility of purpose.
From a slightly different point of view, the code makes up
for what Bell sees as the loss of a transcendental ethic by
substituting an entirely pragmatic or utilitarian one. It
should hardly be surprising, then, that at the end of the
second hired man's narrative, when he is asked if his
former employer discharged him, he replies in some
dismay: "'Discharge me? No! He knew I did just right.'"

IV
Near the end of his well-known essay "Deep Play:
Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," Clifford Geertz attempts
to explain why the Balinese, a people "shy to the point of
obsessiveness of open conflict," should feature the
cockfight almost as the central informing event of their
culture, an event in which they "portray themselves as wild
and murderous, with manic explosions of instinctual
cruelty." Surrounded by stratified layers of ritual and
carefully structured social meaning, the fight itself, Geertz
suggests, comprises a "powerful rendering of life as the
Balinese deeply do not want it ... set in the context of a
sample of it as they do in fact have it." Though a
cockfighting ring in Bali seems a long way from a hayfield
in New Hampshire, one way to view the violent center of
"The Code," with its surround of recommended
cooperative conduct, is to imagine it too as presenting an
image of working life as confrontation-an image of life as
Frost and his narrator "deeply do not want it"-set in the
context of life "as they do in fact have it," at least during
this moment when they have been brought together in a
bond of mutual understanding. What finally disturbs,
however, is the obvious relish with which the hired hand
recollects his story of violent class confrontation. As Geertz
writes concerning the cockfight, "the slaughter in the cock
ring [like a creatively envisioned encounter in New
Hampshire, one might add] is not a depiction of how
things literally are among men, but what is almost worse, of
how, from a particular angle, they imaginatively are" ( 446).
And how in an environment no longer informed by the old
redeeming values, Frost appears to be saying in "The
Code," they are likely to remain.O
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Cicadas
We learned about sex from Billy McLeary
that summer of the seventeen year cicadas.
We were seven, barefoot
and sun blonde.
Their mealy exoskeletons littered
the sidewalk like strewn handfuls of dates.
We saw them flailing in our breakfast cereal,
dreaded a crunch into insect flesh,
as if somehow our fruit
could come alive.
They crawled out of the seventeen year womb
of our crabapple tree,
scaled the highest twigs with twitching feelers
and shrilled their cicada lullaby,
a tinny drone over us
in the purple-green August twilight.
They skittered beneath our heels
in our frantic flashlight tag till
the streetlights glowed on
and our moms called us home.
Billy McLeary, seventeen and wise,
told us all about it.
About the white smudge
on the underside of the girl-ones
and some magnetic perfume
that oozed from their bellies.
We scanned the grass for pairs in piggyback,
plucked them apart and tossed them at targets.
And he laughed at us
like he knew something else
about the rustle of those bodies
between the thick green blades,
as if he heard words
in their relentless hum.

Barbara Fischer
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'SENSITIVITY TO STRUCTURE':

AN INTERVIEW

WITH ARTHUR DANTO
Thomas D. Kennedy

TK: A good starting point for us would be to have you
reflect a little upon your career. You're both a highly esteemed
philosopher, known for your work in the analytical philosophy of
history, and books on Nietzsche and Sartre, as well as philosophy
of art, and you're also now a prominent art critic for The Nation.
Would you be willing to tell us about the connection of those two
vocations, about how they come together? How did the
philosopher Arthur Dan to become an art critic?
AD: Well, all right, I'll be glad to talk a little bit about
that. It's autobiography, naturally. Like most things in life
it was an accident in one sense, but it was an accident I was
prepared for. When I published the Transfzguration of the
Commonplace my interest in that book was that it should
really reach a world broader than the professional
philosophical world. I had written a series of books of
analytical philosophy and I didn't want to call it an
analytical philosophy of art. I dido 't think that's what it
was; I felt that the issues it addressed were issues of
concern to artists and other people in the art world, and as
a matter of fact, it fulfilled my hopes that it would reach a
broad audience. It was widely discussed and reviewed in
places like the Villa~ Voice and the Soho News and places
where philosophy books don't very often get reviewed .
That led finally to The Nation. The editor called me up
one day, quite out of the blue, saying we don't know one

VU philosophy professor Tom Kennedy spent five weeks in San
Francisco this summer as a participant in the NEBsponsored summer institute "Philosophy and the Histories of the
Arts." Perhaps no contemporary philosopher had contributed more
to this discussion than Arthur C. Danto of Columbia University,
who served as director of the institute. In his 1981 The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Harvard University
Press) and his 1986 The Philosophical Disenfranchisement
of Art (Columbia University Press) and his current essays in
philosophy of art and art criticism, he has argued for the
importance of an awareness of historical context for understanding
specifu: uxrrks of art as well as art itself Kennedy reports here on
one of a number of conversations with Danto this summer.
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another, but we have friends in common and she'd read
some things I had written. Would I be interested in writing
for The Nation:? Now, in fact, I would have loved to have
written for The Nation. It was exactly what I wanted to do
but I had no way of doing it if somebody hadn't asked me.
I certainly don't feel as though I could have gone to The
Nation and said, "I'm Arthur Danto. I'm a well-known
philosopher; I've written a book on the philosophy of art
and I'd like to be your art critic." It couldn't have
happened that way. And, in fact, when I published my first
piece in The Nation they didn't even want me to sign it with
my academic credentials. I simply was the author of The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. They were suspicious of
academics.

TK: But why should The Nation, or any magazine, care to
have an acad e mic-especially a philosopher trained in the
analytic tradition of philosophy, serve as an art critic? Of what
value could your training in philosophy be for that task?
AD: Although I love writing art criticism I really love
being a journalist too. I couldn't be the kind of journalist
that I am ifl weren ' t a philosopher. I think that probably
the art that I choose to write about in the first instance is
work about which I can say something philosophical. I
don't ordinarily write what one thinks of as reviews. I write
essays on works or bodies of work that people are going to
see but which have some kind of a philosophical bearing
and I'm able to make that explicit, which gives me an
advantage over a lot of art critics who don't have that sort
of background when in fact a lot of the work that they
address really needs it. A lot of art is more philosophically
informed in certain kinds of ways than one realizes. For
example, a lot of critics are formalists, particularly those
that came up in the late 50s through the early 60s, those
whose inspiration would be somebody like Clement
Greenberg. They were primarily schooled to write about
painting of a certain sort, painting that is visually gratifying
painting you can analyze and judge as to whether it's good
or bad. But so much of contemporary work isn't formalist
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painting. Much of it is conceptual in ways that certain
critics resent, whereas I'm very hospitable to it. I don't feel
my job as a critic is to just talk about the work that appeals
to me as an individual. I talk about the work that I think is
difficult to understand; philosophy is very helpful in that
way. So I think there are two things that I've been able to
do which I'm grateful for. One is what I've just described,
that is to say, bring in philosophy to bear on these works so
that they yield up meanings to my readers that they might
not have gotten just by seeing the show. But, more than
that, I've given a kind of application to philosophy. In
other words, instead of just writing for other aestheticians
I've shown a way, I think, for aestheticians to write for a
larger group. I'm gratified that my column has been so
successful from that point of view. I mean, the proof for
that sort of thing is whether you do have avid readers and
The Nation has about 90,000 subscribers right now. And
everybody who subscribes reads the magazine , so I'm
writing for real readers. But the percentage of readers who
have studied philosophy, I imagine, is relatively few-of
college educated people probably most have had only one
philosophy course. But, it is nice to know that our subject,
our discipline, as it were, doesn't have to be restricted to its
own practitioners.

TK: It seems to me that most people would be surprised
to think that theories about art and rich understandings of art
could come from the analytic tradition. How do you see your
work in the analytic tradition as contributing to helping people
understand art?
AD: Well, one of the great things about analytical
philosophy is that it gives you a great sensitivity to
structure, to the way structure holds together, to the
architecture of thought. And, you can approach things
from that kind of structural point of view with a discipline
of analytical philosophy as you couldn't, let's say, if you
were an existentialist. Heidigger wrote deeply about
certain works, but he couldn't write about everything.
He could write about Vincent's painting shoes, he
could write about a Grecian temple and so forth, but
Heidigger couldn't be a reviewer. I couldn't imagine that
kind of thing happening. He wrote about those and only
those things that fit his metaphysics. And same with Sartre,
who wrote one of the best essays ever written on art. He
wrote an essay on Giacometti, but they were personal
friends and he was able to fit that into some of the issues
about perception and consciousness that he was interested
in and he was able to write about Tintoretto from the
perspective of being a political rebel. But, I don't think
Sartre could have written about everything in the way in
which somebody who has taken on the responsibility of
writing a column has to do. There's a kind of universality
and almost impersonality about analytical philosophy
which makes it a wonderful discipline for somebody who is
going to take on any body of discourse and see how it holds
together and what are the logical points of connection
within it. I found no difficulty in applying that to painting.
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Of course, like any professional philosopher, I do know a
certain amount about the history of philosophy and I've
been able to draw on that when it's seemed appropriate.
Now and again I bring in Hegel or Heidigger or Sartre; I'm
always grateful for my training as an analytical philosopher.
As I say, it has enabled me to do a job that another kind of
philosophy wouldn't be able to do.
TK: Certainly one of your best known pieces in recent
years is the essay "The End of Art" which appears in The
Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art. I think many artists and
people who are familar with art would at least be puzzled, if not
outraged, at your suggestion that art has somehow ended. What
were you trying to get at in "The End of Artr'
AD: I think of that essay as a liberating rather than a
depressing piece, but before I published it, when I
presented it to groups of artists, I think that initially they
were relatively hostile. When they saw what I was getting at
they found it a very reassuring idea. What I said was that
we are at the end of a certain model of art history-a
progressive model of art history-and a certain obligation
that that model placed on artists to be historically correct.
We now have the notion of political correctness but the
notion of historical correctness, of doing the right thing at
the right time and not doing the wrong thing at the right
time, that obligation is something that someone who grew
up in the New York art world as I did would be very, very
sensitive to. The times when people would say "You can't
do this, you've got to do that. We can no longer do the
figure, we can no longer do.... That's sentimental. That is
literary. That is decorative. That is reactionary." All those
kind of things. Artists who didn't want to toe this line of
"art-historical correctness" were on the constant defensive.
I thought that that model of art history had really come to
an end and it came to a natural end.
I do think the structure, the history of art, was
defined by that model from about 1300 down to about as I
like to say the middle 1960s-maybe 1970, I'm not exactly
sure-where the artist felt his or her task to be to carry
forward art in a way not at all unlike the way in which
scientists think of it as their role to carry forward knowlege,
the conquest of the world, the translation of the world into
cognitive equivalencies. Artists were required to do that as
well. I thought that probably that notion ends when art
finally begins to recognize what its own philosophical
nature is. That's what I was talking about. I talked about it
in connection with Andy Warhol, primarily, and the Brillo
Boxes. In my book about what philosophy is, Connections to
the World, I try to show that all philosophical problems, at
least in my view, have a common form. You've got two
things belonging to radically different categories that look
exactly alike and then you've got to say in what the
difference consists. I think that Warhol, and possibly
before him Duchamps, had finally seen that that was the
problem of art. Once you realize what the philosophical
nature of art is, then it's up to the philosophers to carry
that on if they want to; artists are liberated to really do
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anything that they care to do. That is to say, we're living in
an age of extreme pluralism which is very healthy I think
and very good. I wrote a piece for The Nation last year
where I said, "Well, we're into the 90s. What are the 90s
like?" I talked about six shows that I had liked particularly,
artists that I felt were extremely good. Then I asked myself
what have they got to do with one another? They belong to
the times but they don't all belong to the same school. As
a matter of fact, it would be difficult to think of six more
different artists than the ones who happen to have had
shows early in 1990. That is the way in which art moves
now, in what I call this "post-historical moment." I never
thought that art was something that would stop. I thought
only that a story which had been the moving engine of the
production of art had ended. That had come to a natural
closure with the philosophical uncovering of art as a
philosophical entity. I hope that doesn't sound too
obscure.
TK: So artists are liberated from certain historical
demands upon them?
AD: That's right.

TK: Are there other demands yet upon the artist that
they're not liberated from, say, moral demands?
AD: I do think that in a lot of cases, these days
particularly, a lot of artists feel that they ought to be doing
something through the art in connection with the causes
that concern them as moral beings. I think particularly in
the period when Greenberg had his ascendency, in the
great period of abstract expressionism, artists did turn their
backs on moral issues. They thought that it was absolutely
enough to be a hero of art and that's all art should be. It
should be kind of pure, and it was arduous to make great
art, to make pure art and there was no other kind of thing
that they cared to do. Now, I think that if you're liberated
you really are liberated, so that it's perfectly possible for
artists to do whatever they want to. I would hate to see a
situation where politics became an imperative the way
history became an imperative before. I think that if my
views have any coherence, then if you are liberated you
really are liberated and if you want to be a purist you can
do that, abstractionist if you want to be an abstractionist, a
minimalist if you want to be a minimalist. You can also be
any one of a number of different things, so there's no one
thing art's any longer obliged to do. But in that earlier
period you had that sense of incredible focus where you
thought the business of art is to make art and to advance
art in the direction of discovering its essence. The history
of art was almost like the history of alchemy. It was an
effort to distill out what the essence of art was and I think
they thought they were very close to it in a way.

TK: To continue with the idea of the liberated artist, is it
ever appropriate for society to say of a given artist that we expect
your art, if not to conform, at least not to conflict with certain
mores of this society?
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AD: Perhaps you have in mind something like the
Mapplethorpe issue. Not our society. We do have a free
society and I think that if we subsidize art we have to
subsidize the freedom of the artist. Let me put it this way.
As you know, I'm terribly impressed with certain thoughts
of Hegel and in particular Hegel's wonderful idea that in a
sense philosophy, religion and art are all what he called
moments of absolute spirit. Art is philosophy in another
guise and philosophy is religion in another guise and so
forth. I think that if we think of it that way and if we think
of religion seriously, religion is nothing but strife--nothing
but strife. If you've got religion you've got heresy; it's just
inseparable from the idea of religion. If you're going to
have freedom of religion you've got to have freedom for
strife, and in a free society that translates back into art. If
you've got art, you've got to expect that you might, if
you're supporting it, have to support something that you
would be as opposed to, as you find yourself opposed to a
religion that's alien to your own. Or, in philosophy I think
where the differences finally are so extreme that there's no
possibility of reconciliation, we just have to live with it.
Differences are not as intensified in philosophy as they are
in religion or as they are in art. We celebrate our political
values in supporting art that's offensive to the community.
That seems to me absolutely appropriate.
TK: To continue your analogy with religion, the
institutions of religion have a way of dealing with heretics-maybe
ignoring them, maybe saying we won't support you, maybe
something more drastic than thaL In light of that analogy why
wouldn't it be appropriate for a community to say "Well, we will
not prevent you from doing art; go ahead and do your arL But, if
you violate our deepest beliefs and values you have no claim to
our support.
AD: Ah, there is an interesting question as to why the
American government should support art in the first place.
I think probably we support it because we feel that it's got a
kind of spiritual value and we feel a great need for it. It was
not a need the framers of the Constitution felt. The 18th
century was a very different time. But in the 20th century
art has increasingly become something people are
concerned about; it does represent a need. On a
liberalized view of what a government should be-let us say
government should take care of the needs of its peoplesupporting art in one form or another is very natural.
There is a need for art because there is a need for a kind of
secular spirituality. The proliferation of art museums is a
kind of evidence for that. I read the statistic that in the
early 1960s a new museum opened on the North American
continent every three or four days. Every three or four
days! So we have something like twenty four or five
museums per million population in the North American
continent. The proliferation of museums is like the
proliferation of cathedrals in the Middle Ages. If, as I
believe to be true, art has a kind of spiritual value, then
there is a spiritual value in having it, and the museums for
it, even if you disagree with it.
The Cnsset
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TK: As a nation, are we sufficiently well-educated to
support and sustain the proliferation of museums that you just
mentioned?
AD: Let me put it this way, there is this problem for
sure: museums are built by cities or communities that have
an educated populace to begin with. No question that
there are a lot of people who don't have that kind of
education, although through a lot of outreach you bring
people into the museums now, art enters the media in so
many different kinds of ways. The incentive for coming to
the museum is stronger than it used to be. When I was a
kid, for example, the art museum was a place thatyou
entered with a sense that youprobably didn't belong there.
It's like a man entering a lingerie shop--you're not quite
sure it's your place at all, you feel almost expelled. Now
museums are much more open and I think the design of
the contemporary museum reflects that fact. Very few
people feel alien to the museum. For one thing there are
things that people can feel comfortable with right away.
There is the cafeteria, there is the gift shop and then, of
course, there is the art which makes it all meaningful, but
it's possible for people to enter the familiar first. It's
symbolic that the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, which is
beautiful-it's a McKim, Mead, White structure, I think,
anyway, from the gilded age, a great temple-like buildinghad a new wing designed by Pei and it's very modern
indeed. Now, that's where you enter the Boston Museum;
you don't enter through those columns, through the great
portal, you enter it through the glass structure which looks
almost like a shopping mall. And you see the gift shop and
you see the restaurant and the place where you buy
earphones and then you enter the museum and then it's
got its own shows. In the new wing is where people have,
for example, the great Monet show, "Monet and the
Nineties, "-the serial paintings were shown , and so forth.
But it's a portal, apertura as the Italians say, an opening to
the community. The consensus is that it's a very good
thing that children should be brought in, that other people
should be brought in whatever their antecedent degree of
education would be, and it would be a great shame, I think,
if museums were only for the educated. Obviously, the
more you know the more you get out of it, but there has to
be something that everybody can get Our times are like all
times. Parents are concerned with their children, that the
children should have richer lives and that art should be
part of that

TK: We, as philosophers, worry a bit whether students have
enough background in philosophy when they graduate from
college. What's the minimal education students should have in
art in order to understand and appreciate visits to museums, to
understand, for example, contemporary art? Is reading The Nation
enough?
AD: (laughing) No, I don't think reading The Nation
is sufficient for anything. I don't know that students read
The Nation, but let me go back since it's come up again.
That magazine is written, is read, by well- educated people;
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they may not be professionally educatedintellectuals, but
they are intellectual. I try to write about shows that they're
likely to want to see, mostly about shows that they're likely
to go see when they come to New York.
I feel a
responsiblity to give them a body of thought about the
show that they can react against. They are already
relatively well educated, already in the habit of going to see
exhibitions of a certain sort. They're not likely to haunt
the galleries in Soho, and they're certainly not likely to go
to the East Village to see art up-and-coming there. They
may be uncomfortable about art galleries in the way in
which I was describing people being uncomfortable in
museums, at a certain point, because galleries are fairly
seedy places and you're not sure you really do belong
there. But in museums they do feel comfortable, and it's
just part of their idea of what life is like-going to movies
or reading certain books. They're not going to read all the
books; they may, as a matter of fact, unfortunately, just
read the top forty literature, but they do read. For them to
understand art, then, I guess what you need is whatever the
equivalent of the top forty would be for art What would
that be? I mean you want some sense of works belonging
to different periods and what it means if they belong to
different periods. You have to understand when the period
is or isn't "real." I think you need a certain amount of
knowledge of history.
I would like to think that you needed some aesthetics
or philosophy of art, but I'm suspicious of a lot of
aesthetics in part because it's so ahistorical, and I feel that
knowing history is important for knowing art There are
lots of myths that people tell about paintings and painters.
I think some acquaintance with some biographies of artists
is a good thing, even though they're a little bit mythic. It's
nice to know what the reception of the work was, what the
obstacles were, those kinds of things I think are a little bit
important. It would be nice to read a little bit of
philosophy, but then I think you'd have to read relatively
contemporary philosophy because I don't think that the
philosophers of the past, with the exception of Hegel, (and
you couldn't ask people to read that because it's so
obscure) were particularly good on art. I don't think Kant
was very good on art, I don't think anybody was much good
on art. But I think that the philosophers of our present
time really are. I guess the best thing would be some kind
of an adequate art history course so you at least get the
sense of progression of different periods. Probably
acquaintance with different cultures is a good thing as well,
and then it's a good thing for people to know that you
can't apply the same criteria to African art or Oceanic art
or Chinese art as you do here. Those probably would be
the two things that would be best done.
TK: What's the role of the art critic today? Is it just
providing background information evaluative assessments to help
us in appreciating works of art?
AD: I think Robert Hughes of Time magazine said
most critics are cheerleaders, that is to say, they've got
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certain artists that they support and they try to advance
them. I don't have any agenda at all. I do see my role
primarily as explanatory. I try to give some sense of how
you would make a judgment-that's not so easy. An awful
lot of critical judgments are judgments in the form "that's
not art," but I don't think such statements are very useful.
I'm very open; I never condemn anything that flat out
because it's in the wrong category, it doesn't conform to
somebody's criteria of what art is, and so on. I think that a
philosophically adequate definition of art has to be so
abstract that it fits anything anyway, so I feel that what is
necessary is explanation and some indication within a
category of how you might talk about something being
better or worse than something else, more successful, less
successful than something else. I couldn't see any other
reason to be an art critic and I wouldn't have much
confidence in an art critic who simply made evaluative
judgments without going into some serious explanation; I
think from that point of view what a critic would be doing
would be teaching by example, trying to get people, first
off, to see that the works really do need explanation, what
Richard Wollheim was saying when he talked about
understanding the meanings of artworks. They don't wear
their meanings on their faces. To get people past "that
looks like my butcher" or "that looks like my Aunt Hilda,"
or "that looks like" or "that reminds me of" or something
like that, get past that and start looking at things and try
and see what they do mean. I think if you got that-what's
it mean?- you would have gotten a lot. Then against that
you might say yes, I see what it means, and then the
question "is it successful or not?" inevitably rises.
So critics should be paradigms for people who go
into shows. I used to do a great deal of drawing. I no
longer do it, but I used to draw when I travelled. I'd draw
the things that I saw. I felt that was the way in which I'd get
to understand art. I call it analytical sightseeing, that is to
say, I would take things apart on the paper. I really felt that
was very rewarding. I could understand a baroque church
by drawing it in a way in which I couldn'tjust by looking at
it. I often thought it: would be a good thing if people went
home and wrote pieces of art criticism themselves, tried to
form ideas and write about art, to think about it from the
perspective of having it published almost. I think it would
greatly enhance people's ways of going to shows because
for the most part we just go in and grunt and groan. We go
in and we say, " Oh, you know, that's beautiful," or '\vow,"
or something like that. If everyone tried to do some art
criticism, a lot could be gained.

TK: Is there some obligation of an artist to respect her
audience?
AD: Recently there was a work of Katie Nolan's that
was made of beer cans, Budweiser beer cans and cutouts of
Lee Harvey Oswald and Patty Hearst and so forth. I
thought the symbols were obvious, that she didn't do more
than put them together and beyond that she took up a
great deal of space. I mean she took up about a sixth of

16

the entire top floor of the Whitney Museum. I thought all
that space for that message- she didn't do enough. I
don't think she respected her audience. I think she just
aggrandized all that space. I thought it was a little bit
insulting to the audience, not because it showed
insufficient technical skill but insufficient artistic skill.
There's a difference. The artistic skill consists in putting
together your symbols in such a way as to have a certain
kind of impact. One felt that this was a thin work even
though it was enormous, and I thought that was the
consensus. Most people thought that way about that
particular work. There were many things I think in that
show that were scary and frightening and you thought
about them afterward but hers I just thought about as a
disappointment, and a failure.

TK: You say you're not a cheerleader for various artists but
who are your favorite artists currently? Who are the ones who
most enrich you, personally, the ones you most appreciate?
AD: I love Cindy Sherman's work, for example. I
find her astonishing. I love Mark Tansey's work, I think
that's wonderful. I like Robert Mangold's work. They're
all very different artists. Cindy is a photographer; Mark
Tansey is a realist and an allegorist of a kind. Mangold is
an abstract artist. Those are all artists that I like. Most of
the artists that I like best don't have much success. I mean
those are people who keep alive the art of painting, which
I think is what I personally am most responsive to. There's
a deliciousness in the way in which they paint. In
California, I think an artist like Wayne Teabow is a
delicious artist, I mean the way the paint goes on, it's
almost edible, edibly good. I love art of that sort in my
deepest self but I would never see myself as a critic just
being an advocate or cheerleader for that kind of art. I
take it that that's my taste. The artists I first mentioned are
extremely successful at it and altogether beyond my means.
I'm not sure I want a Mark Tansey particularly when those
are large public works and they belong in large important
collections. If I buy anything it would be a small painting.
TK: If the history of art has ended then I suppose any sort
of predictions about the future of art are nonsense, that anything
will go.
AD: The periods where people were prepared to say
anything goes were periods of intense philosophical search,
as a matter of fact, they were exploring limits. I think the
age of exploring limits is now pretty much over, trying to
find out what the limits are. Once that's over with, once
that's something you're leaving more and more to
philosophers to think about, then I think art becomes
inevitably richer and deeper and more conceptual. It's got
a different mission than the exploration of limits, if you see
what I mean. It can become quite unpredictable. We, a
number of us, were talking about this artist at the Berkeley
Museum, Rosemarie Truckle, a German artist, a German
feminist conceptualist. I don't think anybody would have
anticipated any of the works that are in that kind of show.
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You know what conceptual art is, you know what feminist
art might be, you know who's a German, but that the art
itself is quite surprising, not on the principle of "anything
goes," but the fact that against a background of anything
goes she can put things together in such a surprising way.
Sometimes they shock, sometimes they surprise, sometimes
they move. They always arouse thought, in any case. I
think that is great, a great kind of thing. What I like is that
you don't just think about it as a breakthrough in the
history of art simply because it is almost, I think, that
maybe the visual arts are getting to be more like literature
now. You're not expecting people to make breakthroughs,
you just expect them to write humanly satisfying works and
I think something like that might be happening with art.

TK: What is there left for philosophy to do?
AD: To define art, I mean to really solve the problem
of what is art. I think that is what philosophers now must
do that they couldn't have done until art was ready for it
because they dido 't know how that history was going to go.
Now that the history has shown the philosophical nature of
art, what we've got to do as philosophers is put it together.
I think in the Transfzguration of the Commonplace I went some
distance towards that, and I think to make the next move is
staggering. I don't know that I'm up to it, I don't who is up
to it. There's a lot to do if you're a philosopher. Q

I Have Nothing Rising
A candle's light can rise above a candle.
Its body, always subject to the flame,
Glides up to join the fire
Or down-escaping.
But I'm no light.
I have nothing rising and warmer
Than my body,
Which has set on its bones
And won ' t flow freely
When the burning starts.
For ifl held my finger in the flame,
My flesh could n ever melt away to safety
Nor stand the pain.
So I can't put my spirit above me,
And I touch nothing of
Greater intensity
Than this thin skin
That will finally roll away
And expose my stiffness.

Barbara Bazyn
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Review Essay

THINKING ABOUT ART
David Morgan

Arthur C. Danto. Encounters & Reflections. Art in the
Historical Present. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1990.
356 pp. $22.95.
Some people have all the luck. Not only do they
think and write very well, they get to think and write about
what they love-in this case, about great works of art.
Philosopher Arthur Danto of Columbia University enjoys
the added distinction of an exquisitely perceptive eye. All
of which makes his art criticism a joy to read. But like most
good thinkers, Danto's work is animated by a deep tension,
one that moves restlessly throughout this collection of art
reviews since 1986.
After repudiating the search for a "pure distilled
essence of art," Dan to provides a defmition of art which
recalls the idealist tradition of essentialism:
... language achieves the status of art when our sentences
embody the ideas they express, as if displaying what the
sentences are about. A picture becomes art when, beyond
representing its idea, properties of i tse If become salient in the
work of embodiment. (~9)
As propositions go, these two are elusive. What they
mean hinges on the significance of ' embodiment.' If art
somehow visualizes ideas, gives visible form or body to
something within us, how does this occur and what is it that
gets embodied? Danto isn't clear on the mechanics (or
metaphysics?) of representation. But then, brief columns
on art criticism are not exactly the place to pursue such
concerns. As for the nature of the idea that becomes
embodied in the work of art, it would seem that Danto
operates with a broad understanding: it could be passion,
David Morgan teaches in the Department of Art and in Christ
College at VU. Interested in varieties of expression, particularly in
the relations between art and the spiritual, Morgan has begun a
long-term project on the work of Warner SalZman and its reception
in the religious community. His last piece in The Cresset was on
the works ofVassily Kandinsky in May, 1991.
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insight, imagination, historical consciousness, even
philosophical discernment or intuition in the case of
Danto's favorite painter, Andy Warhol. Or, to raise the
spectre of Dan to's chief philosophical affinity in this book,
is what finds embodiment in the work of art something on
the order of Hegel's Geist? Although he makes several
metaphorical references to the Spirit at work in history (at
least one assumes they are metaphorical), evolving toward
absolute embodiment or supreme self-expression, Danto's
chief location of Geist is in the human person. The work
of art, as the embodiment of an idea, "parallels the way in
which our minds are embodied in· ourselves as persons"
(9). It is not reason that art embodies, not pure being or
the ideal essence of anything-except perhaps the essence
of humanity. When art attempts to visualize reason, it
reaches its end, as Hegel argued, and as Danto fully agrees,
because it leaves its bailiwick; it seeks to do the work of
rational thought, not visual expression (where expression is
understood as the virtually sacramental act of transforming
what is within in to something that is without).
Hegel saw the history of art as an essentially spiritual
movement; Danto likewise experiences art as a spiritual
affair. He recounts an aesthetic rebirth of 1985, when he
saw the work of the Japanese painter, Chuta Kimura:
I had, I realize, grown disenchanted with beauty. I had
thought too long of painting in terms of the philosophical
questions it raises, as if art were a dislocated form of
philosophy itself. Kimura brought back to life for me the
irreducible and unanalyzable powers of painting in its highest
vocation. (117)
Danto goes on to describe his "first encounter" with
Kimura's work. "In truth, one felt in the work the radiance
of a religious joy, next to which the ordinary pleasures of
even a happy life have barely any weight. Kimura's
relationship to his art must have been close to that ecstatic
engagement with a radiant reality one reads about
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occasionally in the literature of mysticism" (ll8). Dan to's
art criticism evokes motifs of contrition, illumination, and
transcendence found in the autobiographies of mystics.
The attentive reader cannot miss the numerous instances
of mystical and sacred metaphor in the author's rich and
evocative writing. "The first time I saw David Sawin's work, I
felt myself to be in the presence of something irresistible,
like a nimbus, self-contained in its intense illumination,
which drew and held me with a force like love" (21). It is
impossible to look at Abstract Expressionist Robert
Motherwell's Spanish Elegy 132, Danto proclaims, "without
feeling oneself in the presence of some human revelation
as deep as painting allows" (195). Cezanne, Motherwell,
Morandi, Kimura: "These are all masters of incandescence,
that presence in their work of something as difficult to
characterize but as easy to recognize as spirit, which is
there independently of the discoveries that have earned
some of them places in the history of art" (21).
The assertion that a work of art, or the beauty in it,
transcends time and place gained a wide currency in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the rise of
aesthetics and the proclamation of genius as the prevailing
force in artistic creation. These developments were linked
to the Enlightenment's postulation of a secular spirituality.
Sacred art, ensconced in the practices of institutional
religion, was replaced by the 'spiritual' in art, and the path
from Hegel's Geist to Kandinsky's das Geistige ensued. The
chief characteristic of the spiritual in art is timelessness or
transcendence. And if there is one thing Danto wishes to
impress upon his readers, it is that the greatest art is
timeless, absolute. Goya and Courbet transcend mere
periodicity, they are for all times, as is the work of
Michelangelo: "We flock to the Sistine Chapel not to be
informed as to the values of the sixteenth-century popes.
We go to be touched in our essential universal humanity"
(327). To the same end, Dan to militates against the social
construction of such concepts as · genius and masterpiece
and sees them as transhistorical, absolute. He wishes the
term 'masterpiece' to designate absolute and universal
value in a work of art The masterpiece, he writes, "must
express humanity ... "For his notion of 'humanity' and
'genius,' Danto goes to the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution (see the insightful and fascinating article
entitled "Masterpiece and the Museum"), and thereby
proclaims his ties with the tradition of a secular spirituality
whose deepest concern is to transpose the sacred
mythology of transcendence and revelation to the secular
terms of spirituality.
The residues of sacred ritual are quite apparent in
Dan to's critical response to art. In a review of an exhibition
of Sienese painting at the Metropolitan Museum of Art,
Danto writes of a particular panel of St. Thomas Aquinas:
"We are drawn in, our feelings are aroused, our curiosity
awakened. Like everything else in this extraordinary
exhibition, this picture addresses us as participants rather
than as witnesses-as if we were among the faithful rather
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than mere visual judges-enlarging rather than reducing
those for whom it brings messages of great assurance and
joy. It is a show you cannot see too many times." It seems
only appropriate, of course, that the philosopher-art critic
should find this icon of the patron saint of Christian
philosophy particularly numinous. But one wonders if
Danto's enlightened search for universals in sacred art
doesn't amount to the same appropriation (read:
stripping) of it which seems so justly offensive in the
Western (ab)uses of African or Asian art. Can Christianity
or any other religion be so neatly demythologized, its true
spiritual essence distilled from its incidental sacred
character, its concrete historicity-all in the interest of
attaining a universal humanity? What happens to its
irreducible and mysterious strangeness that Danto is so
keen to preserve on a personal level in his experience of a
painting by Correggio?
There .is a certain internal strangeness to the painting that
remains once one has worked through the external
strangenesses that inevitably separate us from the work of a
very different time. It is like the mystery possessed by someone
with whom one is perfectly familiar. Surrender yourself to
that, if you can ... (93)
The work of art opens up a new world, Danto
suggests-but he inherits such rhetoric from the
Napoleonic imperialism of the Enlightenment, the will to
encounter new worlds by invading and occupying them.
The Enlightenment project assumed that everything was
accessible to reason, every boundary penetrable to the
restless probing of the indomitable human spirit. All
difference is cancelled by virtue of the universality of
human reason and curiosity. The construct 'humanity'
served as a warrant for global imperialism-in the interests
of universal human curiosity, of course.
Danto ends his book with a fascinating essay that
brings Hegel's diagnosis of the end of art to bear on art
since Hegel. According to Danto, art reaches the end that
Hegel discerned when it turns to ponder its own existence,
at which point it ceases being art and becomes philosophy.
Modernism in art is this concern for self-definition. Danto
is unsure whether to date this in the second half of the
nineteenth century or sometime in the early twentieth, but
he finds the issue of self-definition "expressed in its purest
philosophical form" in Warhol's Brillo boxes, exhibited in
1964, which pose the question "why something should be a
work of art while something altogether like it should not"
(343). By 'end of art', Danto does not mean anything so
silly as the termination of all artistic production. The end
of art, in his view, occurs with the direct embodiment of
ideas in form. The end of art is announced when art is
used to illustrate something which is foreign to its nature,
when art becomes only a means of illustration, when its
surfaces become impervious to the idea that formerly
animated the work of art. Warhol's Brillo boxes or
Duchamp's signed urinal pose the question 'what is art?'
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rather than elicit a traditionally defined aesthetic
experience. But, in contrast to Danto's thesis, the
'philosophization of art' is not part of an inexorable
historical progression as Hegel believed. Art has often
worked on the cusp of other modes of discourse. Allegory
has linked the visual arts with literature and philosophy;
performance has joined art with opera, theatre, and dance;
craft has inserted art into the rhythms of daily life; ritual
has bound art to religion; propaganda has placed art in the
service of the state. In other words, 'art' is forever testing its
limits or having them tested. Art is always being defined,
redefined. The end of art is perennial.
Despite his intellectual fascination with Warhol,
Danto argues for an art beyond the modernist end of art.
He joins many in announcing the death of modernism and
derides Clement Greenberg's formalist art criticism, which
had hailed the self-defining tendency in modernist art.
Since it was Greenberg, in a well-known essay entitled
"Modernist Painting," who traced this impulse to the
critical self-consciousness of Kantian philosophy, it may be

that Danto's disdain for Greenbergianisrn amounts to a
desire to secure the legitimacy of an aesthetic rooted in
such quintessentially Enlightenment concepts as
'humanity', 'freedom', and 'universality.' Greenberg's
formalism, it would seem, leads to the end of art, which,
however it may intrigue Dan to the philosopher, is not what
engages Dan to the art lover. In the fmal pages of his book,
he writes that artists can free themselves from the practice
of art-as-philosophy simply by ceasing to search for the
essence of art, at which point they will be liberated from
the determinism of history and enter a posthistorical age of
freedom. Once freed from the historical imperative of
working out the Spirit's self-expression, artists will enjoy the
opportunity to create as if ex nihilo, without a past
impinging on them, and will therefore create once again
timeless, absolute works of art. What Danto seems to be
saying is that transcendence and epiphany are not lost to
art. It's a rather facile fiat he pulls on Mr. Hegel, but
understandable given the author's commitment to
preserving the secularized spirituality and metaphysics of
the Enlightenrnent.O

The Face That Told Her Nothing
"This is what I'll do," she told her mother.
"I know who I am." So she went with him,
and when the winds died down and water sluiced
through at the corner of the garden where
the land tipped toward the bottom, they went
to the pasture in boots and he told her
how it would be now with no crops corning in.
Back in the kitchen she got dinner ready,
watching from the window for the men to
come up from the fields, and listened
to the news that said the creeks were out
and bridges were down, to stay out of
the country.

So she watched him eat with the others,
their shoulders hunched over their biscuits
and gravy, and at night held herself stiffiy
between cold sheets and watched the moonlight
on the heavy chintz curtains she had from
her mother, hearing the rain in the rain gutters.
Then she would go to the window and press
her body against the glass, hard and cold,
until her face disappeared in the dark rainthe face that told her nothing now.

J. T. Ledbetter
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How Do We Get to
Grover's Conters?
Charles Vandersee
Every now and then the last few
months the word citizenship enters my
mind, for no reason. "What is this?"
I'm asking myself. Why is this word
coming down, no meaning attached,
no explanation?
Does it connect with something
local?
The University here in
Dogwood is sometimes charged with
"not being a good citizen." For one
thing, it put up a whopping medical
center not made of familiar red brick,
a porcellaneous city unto itself, which
some people call ugly.
Also, the University attracts
students, who have outdoor parties.
Plastic and paper litter the
neighborhoods.
Someone may
urinate on a private flower. Partyers
turn up amplifiers, and not just on
weekends.
But citizenship didn't seem to
connect with nuisances .
Our
apprentice drunks and white medical
temple aren't all that offensive. We're
heavily into tradition here, and
town/gown chafing is one of the
traditions.
Citizenship also wasn't arriving
from reading. I don't poke around
much in the two dark and hazardous
Charles Vandersee, at the University of
Virginia, is mostly away from the classroom
this year, but has been looking with
students, and Hemingway and Fitzgerald
and Dos Passos, at Americans living in the
restless 1920s.
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structures called political theory and
moral reasoning. Rawls, Lasch,
Nozick, Alasdair Maclntyre-are those
some of the names? My mind can't
deal with this kind of erudite
architecture.
A few years ago I did read Habits
of the Heart, when everybody was
reading it. It has stories and people.
The word citizenship must have been
there, though I don't recall. Last
summer a student I know pretty well
had an internship in Washington with
Amitai Etzioni, professor at George
Washington University, and his new
magazine The Responsive Community,
in teres ted in people helping each
other locally, through strengthening
volunteer institutions (churches,
charities). At least this is what it
sounds like-one kind of citizenship,
possibly.
The 1992 presidential campaign
didn't seem to be the source of these
citizenship blips. Newspaper stories
haven't been using the word. A
magazine profile finally fixed in my
mind a single fact about Clinton, and
not a useful fact: He's from one of
the two states in the Union that one
never, ever thinks of (the other being
Idaho). Otherwise, he sounds like just
another Rhodes Scholar running for
office since cradledom, not a citizen.
And no one ever called the current
White House occupant a good citizen,
so far as I recall.
Had citizenship come up in old
school days? Doubtful. We heard
about the three-part division of the
federal government, and a vague
obligation to vote. But small-town
wisdom outside the classroom
contradicted the latter piety. All
politicians were the same, wisdom
said, and while no one was going to
take your job away if you voted, you
better not make a big deal about it.
So I dun no. I ask myself and get
no answers. Being careful not to ask
too hard-if presidents and
presidential candidates aren't
necessarily good citizens, maybe I'm
not one either. Good citizens are
supposed to watch Meet the Press, for
example (or maybe a postmodern
show with a clashier format-isn't
there one called McLaughlin's

Motormouths1). But here in Virginia all
these air on Sunday morning between
ten and noon. Maybe for citizenship
every narthex in the state needs a wide
screen.
Citizenship is hard to figure out,
and also non-citizenship. At the
university in Dogwood, we still have
too few African American students
(does that say something about
collective citizenship?), but one of
them came in a week or two ago to get
a recommendation. My favorite type
of student: wry, well-read, loves to
write,
full
of miscellaneous
information, easy to banter with,
ambitious but not cramming for the
presidency since cradlehood. As we
talked, he mentioned Jonathan
Kozol's new book, which I haven't
read: about inequality in American
schools, because suburbs have lots of
money while inner cities and
Appalachian valleys don't. Nobody
has figured out what to do, and
nobody cares; is this an example of
non-citizenship?
Also, the NIMBY syndrome of
recent years. Nuclear plants and waste
dumps and housing projectsneeded, but Not In My Back Yard. Is
all this stuff going underground in my
mind and surfacing with these little
blips, like small bubbles of waste from
Love Canal, this word citizenship over
and over, unattached to anything?
Because, no kidding, this has really
been happening.
And not, as I mentioned,
because I especially think about these
matters. Jonathan Kozol I admire,
from a host of books, especially Death
at an Early Age, read years ago. I'm
glad he's an angry man, also Ralph
Nader (is Ralph Nader still alive?),
and I'm glad Etzioni is stirring up
some new thinking. Maybe these
people are exemplary citizens.
Yet I really don't know, but the
other day the word came up yet again,
with a slightly new angle. It was
Catharine Stimpson using the word,
one of the country's fine ladies, a
literary scholar, dean at Rutgers,
recently president of the Modern
Language Association. This is the
organization that English professors
belong to, as doctors belong to the
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AMA. The MLA has been attacked
lately, especially the year after
Stimpson's term, when it protested
the nomination of Carol Iannone to
the council of the National
Endowment for the Humanities.
Iannone, an adjunct professor whose
publications are mostly partisan essays
in a conservative monthly, Commentary,
isn't all that much of a scholar, said
the MLA. Lynne Cheney, head of the
NEH, retorted that the MLA just
didn't want a conservative on the
board.
It was a review of that battle,
fought in the media, that Stimpson
presented in one of her two lectures
here.
It was arranged by our
Commonwealth Center for Literary
and Cultural Change, where I'm
helping out this year. Included in the
battle rhetoric, Stimpson reported,
was a right-wing attack on Phyllis
Franklin, head of the MLA, for being
a worse threat to the U.S. than
Saddam Hussein. On the ground that
internal "culture wars" in the U.S. are
more serious for America's future
than wars with any foreign dictator.
The NEH battle and the Gulf war were
being fought at about the same time.
Oppositions within the American
culture have in recent years been so
fierce and deeply felt (abortion,
pornography, prayer in the schools)
that "war" is actually an apt metaphor.
It was after her account of the
fierceness over this one appointment
to the NEH board that Stimpson
paused to suggest that in the America
of the next few years the question of
citizenship is going to be a major issue.
Sitting at her side, as moderator
for this brown-bag lunch session, I
pricked up my ears. Here was the
intrusive word, unsought and
undisclosing. Stimpson's concern was
that all the cultural issues have
become dichotomized, and that every
single issue now generates a full-scale
war. All issues have only two sides,
and all issues are matters of life and
death. She began to suggest (but had
to stop, to catch a plane) that
citizenship must be a capacity for
moving beyond the dichotomous and
out of full battle dress. Citizenship
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means something other than giving
every issue two and only two sides,
picking one, then going about
bludgeoning.
Well, I didn't know what to make
of this, and still don't. I call a lot of us
good citizens here at the university,
because we do our work well, and the
work is beneficial to others. We hate
fights, and mistrust Manichaeans. But
is this enough?
Talking with the student
needing a recommendation, I
dragged out one of my favorite points,
not too passionately, I hope: that
literary study -the reading of novels
and plays and poems-is really the
only effective way of nurturing the
imagination. The imagination, that is,
moves a person for hours at a time
into someone else's experience and
consciousness. Movies and 1V dramas
can give you experience, but they
can't fully deal with consciousness:
desires, motives, fears, construals, and
illusions. My further point was the
nurturing of the imagination is
necessary in order to feel what it's like
to be a part of a nation. I.e., a citizen.
You can read magazine articles
and see TV documentaries, and be
moved and enlightened, but an
author who takes you inside the actual
mind of a sharecropper or CEO is
what's finally wanted. A mind, with its
motives, is an evolving construct,
responsive to all kinds of things that
happen, and in two or three hundred
pages of things happening you
actually learn about that mind.
You would not necessarily
forgive-as Graef Crystal, once adviser
to CEOs on how to rake in millions,
now campaigns, unforgivingly, against
bloated salaries. But you would have
insight into how individual human
beings chose their respective wars,
what it's like to have strong feelings
and reject compromise. You then
might
resist
calling
every
provocateur-Jesse Helms or Robert
Mapplethorpe-a bearer of the
Apocalypse.
Feeling that you know a bunch
of minds in the nation, you might ask
how the nation belongs to each, and
thus begin conceiving citizenship.

Still, all this seemed beside the
point.
Not faithfully reading
campaign news, or watching
Bushbashing and Buchananbaiting on
1V, or spending much time in culture
wars, I felt somewhat comfortable in
aloofness, since I'm not sure people
should pretend to understand what
they don't, and the hierarchy of
important issues in this year's election
is not at all clear to me. Nor do I have
a vision of the possible sustainable
America, some structure of virtue we'll
all look at with self-yielding affection.
As part of this year with the
Commonwealth Center, I organized
some book discussions for the public,
at the new branch library in the
shopping center. Our research
fellows at the Center each chose a
book, as did I, on the theme, "No
Turning Back." The book I chose is
by my favorite anarchist, Henry Adams
("Conservative Christian Anarchist,"
he called himself): his anonymous
and rather bitter novel of 1880 titled
Democracy. I began the session by
hazarding that the U.S. in our time is
very likely ungovernable (being too
large and complex), but that people
in Adams' time did hope it was
governable. He thought democracy
virtually a failure, but advised no
turning back, because monarchy and
totalitarianism were worse.
For Adams, corruption was the
problem, and he thought that maybe
corruption could be stanched. Today
corruption remains a problem, the S
& L bandits quite matching any
barons of the Gilded Age. But there 's
a big difference; we have a mammoth
federal debt, also an overwhelming
mass of data and opinions impossible
for a legislative staff to sort through,
to reach wise judgment on matters
that come before House and Senate.
So all appropriations bills are by
definition bad, because they add to
the national debt. And on general
policy issues most votes yield "no win"
situations. Voting for fiscal restraint
means an economy in doldrums and
people losing jobs; "stimulating the
economy" means assaulting the
environment.
Local and state governments do
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have issues one can get one's mind
around, but the nation itself cannot
be governed. This does not mean
collapse, since a nation doesn't have
to be governable to survive, but it does
raise the question of what any of us as
"citizens" might usefully do, in and for
the nation.
That big citizenship question
obviously isn't answered by saying that
each of us should be content locally
with doing our little best. Or that we
need a vision only our leaders and
would-be leaders can provide. Or that
we have to replace wars and polarities
with an effort to reason together.
Perhaps what I'm looking for is a
wholly new intervention in national
culture, produced not by a sociologist
or a visionary or a politician, or a
Fulghum or an Adams. It would have
to be a story, I think-a work of art It
would have to be a video cassettedespite its overty, TV is our one
universality, and a video is in reach at
any hour. The story too has to be
within our reach: not soap opera, alos
not a lofty and classical ideal. A story
about people, who are recognizably
building some sort of structure, but a
story eschewing the tedious and
unconvincing moral language of
community and society, and neighborhood
and bond.
Perhaps without language at all,
a cassette story with acts and images
that would entice equally in to its
sacralized rectangle the drug dealer
and the CEO,
the too-sure
fundamentalist and all driven
treadmillers.
Then, perhaps, there would be a
day in the year when the government
did not show up for work, and schools
were empty and silent, as everywhere
at the screen people write themselves
into the story's future, preparing to
emerge into the sun, artists, rested,
with their new scripts for a nation
whose parts are willing to coexist just a
week at a time.
From Dogwood in election year,
yours skeptically,
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Super Powers,
Super Stars,
and Super Salaries
Michael Becker
"How can anybody be worth that
much money?" he says, looking up
from a newspaper. Or maybe without
props, just his mouth descending to a
frown. A lively conversation begins in
any neighborhood bar or faculty
lounge in America. He doesn't need
to say more or even respond to
questions. Someone will focus the
argument. Ryne Sandberg, Arnold
Schwarzenegger, or sports or movie
stars in general. More and more these
days the talk runs to chief executive
officers of major corporations.
Presidential candidate Jerry
Brown says that astronomical salaries
and providing jobs for Mexicans are all
corporate executives are interested in.
Some congressmen are suggesting that
corporations should not be allowed to
deduct salaries in excess of some
maximum. Will Greider, writing on
tax legislation in Rolling Stone says, "If
business is going to get tax breaks,
Congress should impose some new
rules. For instance, no company
should be eligible if its executives are
enjoying scandalously high salaries
and bonuses." Some of these people
may even be serious.
There's a lot more of this kind of
talk recently. It's because of the
recession. One economic theory says
satisfaction with one's wealth is more
related to the person's wealth in

relation to that of others than to the
absolute level ofwealth. To be able to
keep up with the Joneses is a satisfying
thing regardless of what the J oneses or
I happen to make. As people are laid
off or threatened with layoffs they feel
less wealthy relative to others and are
less satisfied and begin to complain
more.
In the 1950s well-orchestrated
oligopolies in many American markets,
automobiles and steel for instance,
made high profits and provided high
wages and salaries for their employees.
Concern for the consumer was
somewhat cavalier as we look at it
today.
That happens when
competition is limited. There was no
foreign competition except for sports
cars and watches. But in time foreign
competitors learned to produce
acceptable products with employees,
workers and executives both, earning
less than in America. They offered a
lower price and took market share.
Eventually they developed superior
products and took more market share.
To stay in the game American firms
had to lower production costs. They
demanded and received wage and
benefits freezes, sometimes even
givebacks. Why hasn't this happened
to the executives at the top? Their
compensation has risen while hourly
workers and middle management
compensation has stagnated or fallen.
A countertrend has been at work.
Explaining
today's
high
compensation for corporate CEOs,
and likely part of its cause, is the
development of agency theory in
financial economics. This is the idea
that business owners, if they are
unable to manage directly their own
business, must rely on agents. To
assure that agents carry out the
owners' objectives, certain costs must
be incurred. These include costs of
audits, costs of larger and more
competent boards of directors to
Michael Becker teaches in the College of
Business Administration at VU and shares
"The Nation" column with colleagues
Berner (law), juneja (English), and Trost
(political science). Next year he will
concentrate on a dissertation.
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oversee
CEO
activities,
and compensation" to executives who for a time long gone. The Yugo
compensation plans designed to make ignore the "needs" of the country? automobile should make us think of
executive and shareholder goals more Who are these selfish shareholders the first Japanese cars to hit our shores.
nearly congruent.
anyway? Well, they are us for one We didn't think much of them either.
CEOs, like everyone else, have thing, we who hold cash values in You can bet that Yugo executives have
personal agendas which are not always insurance policies and shares in heard all of Johnny's and Jay's jokes
matched to the goals of their firm's mutual funds and interests in pension and are working on the problem.
shareholders. To achieve congruence plans, our savings for down payments Competition in the next century, for
of goals, corporations make CEOs into on homes, college tu1t10n, or America and for Japan, will come from
shareholders, rewarding them in stock, retirement. The College Retirement places like Nigeria and Paraguay and
and providing stock options and bonus Equities Fund (CREF), which is where the Ukraine. And at some point such
plans tied to performance of the firm's many of us on campus keep retirement countries will figure out how to build
shares. To avoid CEOs. focusing only savings, held $34 billion in its stock some product we want with better
on short-term performance in order to account at the end of 1990. I haven't quality and a cheaper price.
maximize their bonus for the current seen the 1991 figures yet, but the stock
Speaking of Japan, it has been
year, compensation plans have been market rise must have brought much noted that Japanese corporate
developed to reward longer term considerable increases in CREF executives' salaries are smaller than
performance. The theory suggests that investment values. Personally, I am not those of their American counterparts.
CEOs are given more compensation planning to request a reduced pension Are Japanese executives therefore less
now, not because they work harder but because American CEOs mainly loyal to their shareholders? It seems
because they pursue goals more closely pursued shareholders' (my) interests otherwise. Japanese executives are said
allied with those of the shareholders, in 1991 in stead of a goal of full to obtain from their culture a greater
namely increasing shareholder wealth. employment in America. Included in regard for their employer and for their
This has led to embarrassing situations. CREF stock account, by the way, is $4.5 fellow employees than is the case for
High bonuses are achieved in a year of billion (about 13 percent of the total) their American counterparts. The
low profits, layoffs in this country. in investments in foreign corporations Japanese executive probably obtains a
That was 1991. These do not seem and governments. This suggests that greater respect and admiration from
desirable results to the average person, college professors aren't much in to his culture as well. He could hardly
including newspaper business section "Buy American."
obtain less.
Respect can be as
reporters who may be concerned about
If American CEOs were somehow satisfying as high pay. Critics suggest
layoffs themselves. They ask why pressed into service in behalf of a that Americans should emulate these
CEOs get rewarded under such national goal, creation of American more altruistic aspects of Japanese
circumstances. The answer is that jobs for instance, even though the goal culture. Why? To sell more products
creating American jobs, or withholding might clash with shareholders and to take jobs away from foreigners.
jobs in Mexico, or making short run interests, how much could they do?
If Japanese executives are more
profits are not what CEOs' employers, The American edge that some critics competent than Americans and work
the shareholders, want them to do. blame U.S. executives for losing is, or for less money, why don't American
Shareholders are interested in was, a monopoly on technology and corporations just hire them? Cultural
increased dividends and/ or rises in resources. The monopoly resulted differences, not wanting to be first,
stock prices. That's pretty much it. partly from hard work by Americans, racism, who knows? If the economics
The stock market is up. It is not and partly from accidents of history. remain strong it will happen. U.S.
illogical that CEOs' compensation in Like any form of organization, Automobile companies started buying
general is also up.
monopoly is subject to entropy. No Japanese steel twenty years ago because
Not all stock returns are up one person and no one country can it was superior in quality and cheaper.
however. And the lowering of interest command disproportionate shares of IfJapanese executives are also superior
rates may have more to do with some the world's wealth forever. Attracted in quality and cheaper, it is only a
stock price increases than CEO by the promise of economic reward, matter of time until they are hired. It
American
performance. Incentive compensation others find ways to compete. America won't be popular.
plans never do work perfectly, whether can work hard and improve itself, but executives being replaced by Japanese
designed to motivate hourly workers or it will enjoy a continually diminishing will find sympathy in an unlikely
the uppermost executives in the piece of the world pie. Is it possible place-blue-collar workers who have
corporation. Incentive plans are that managing a U.S. firm when world felt or fear the same fate. The likely
intended only to increase the degree trends are against us is more difficult result of such increased competition
of overlap between worker and and deserves more reward than in that for CEO jobs will be the lowering of
economic paradise of the 1950s?
top executive salaries.
company or shareholder goals.
On the other hand, would a
Should self-serving shareholders
The 1992 election year theme of
be allowed to award "scandalously high "American First" is fueled by nostalgia Japanese take an American CEO's job?
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Satoshi Iue, President of Sanyo
Electric observes in Business Week
[March 30, 1992] that American
executives spend more hours on the
job than many executives of Japanese
concerns.
"My feeling is that
American company presidents work
extremely hard and are under a lot of
stress. If I had to work in America, it's
quite possible I'd want to be
compensated like an American." The
Business Week article from which this
comes advocates lower compensation
for top executives.
The bigger trend of business
internationalization may cause our
scenarios to play out in slightly
different ways. It may be a fifty
percent Japanese owned General
Motors that employs the first Japanese
CEO. It may be the merged FordMitsubishi-Volkswagen Corporation
that builds the first automobile in
Nigeria. These are not popular things
to think about in the "America First"
election year of 1992. Maybe trends
toward internationalization will be
halted. And maybe General Motors
will get back their former fifty plus
percent of the American automobile
market.
And maybe Wayne
Campbell's scenario involving those
flying monkeys will take place.
The values behind the whole
executive reform argument seem a
little skewed. The objection seems to
be that executives are paid more than
they are worth. But it seems to be OK
for people to have more than they are
worth, those who inherit wealth for
instance. Is this a new version of "old
money is superior to new money"
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argument? And what about people
who win lotteries? Aren't they getting
more than they deserve?
Maybe we can think about this
thing in another way. Top executives
of top firms work extremely hard,
harder than any sports or movie star
ever dreamed of. Say they get a base
salary of a million dollars or so. Say
they can make another million or so
by superior performance for their
shareholders. But they also get a
lottery ticket which pays off really big,
tens of millions say, if some rather
unlikely things happen to the
economy or the corporation or its
competitors. Would that be fair? In
effect this is pretty much what actually
happens, I think.
USA Today tells us [March 27,
1992] that on this issue "the hoopla
isn ' t likely to fizzle soon." This is a
strange statement for a newspaper
where the hoopla usually fades before
the ink is dry. I think the hoopla will
fade, maybe even before the fall
elections. People will get tired of it.
Cool heads will prevail. No laws will
limit compensation. such laws would
put most professional ball clubs out of
business, for one thing. And once
employment picks up, people will have
a lot less to resent
There is a government approach
to pay inequity that has been used to
good effect in the past. Remember
the graduated income tax? Not the
wimpy version we have now, but the
one where really well-off folks were
placed in a 91 percent tax bracket.
Ninety-one percent! Later the highest
rate was reduced to 50 percent. Now it

is 28 percent The last reduction was
achieved when Ronald Reagan traded
away a host of pro-business tax laws.
Now Bush wants the pro-business tax
features back (capital gains tax,
investment tax credit, lower minimum
corporate tax, passive losses on real
estate), but without reinstatement of
higher tax rates for the rich. Will
Greider thinks he may get his way. I'm
not so sure. Bush may have made a
colossal error in vetoing the recent tax
bill (Democratic) which would have
reduced most people's taxes in
America at the expense of the richest
one percent. A Democratic White
House and Congress is possible in
1993. Hoopla over the rubber check
issue will be gone before the election.
A tradeoff of steeper graduated rates
for return of some of the pro-business
tax features Reagan gave away is likely
no matter how the election goes. It
would have happened already if it
weren't for "read my lips."
A self-evident corollary to Jesus'
saying about the poor is, "The rich you
will always have with you." Can we try
not to be so hard on high-earning
CEOs? Clearly such people do
something quite uncommon to earn
their money. What would we do
without them? Remember how Dante
reserved a special place in purgatory
for princes who were so busy doing
their jobs of ruling that they didn't
attend to their own salvation. Dante
gave them a second chance rather
than sending them straight to hell.
Can we be similarly compassionate to
corporate execu tives?O
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Friday, the Thirteenth
For this day when Eve carried fruit
To the willing mouth of Adam.
For this day, years later, when Noah
Set sail on the eraser flood.
For the morning when the builders
Spoke a thousand tongues in Babel.
For the crumble and collapse,
This noon, of Solomon's temple.
For the death, before dark, of Christ,
All the Bible's subsequent bad luck.
For the moments of ice or water
Or ill-judged curves which swerve our cars.
For the vague ache, for the fierce pain,
Misery arriving on the phone.
For the day some of us were born.
For Friday whose number we whisper.
For anniversaries which turn us
Toward our caves, the thigh bones we brandish
When the family fire blinks out
And we rise fierce with growl and roar.

Gary Fincke
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Finding Life in the
Movies
RoyM. Anker

In his very remarkable book,
Awakenings, neurologist Oliver Sacks
recounts his long work in the 1960s
with sufferers of post-encephalitic
Parkinsonianism, a bizarre disorder
that physically immobilizes or freezes
its victims for decades, usually barring
them from self-expression and
rudimentary communication. For
these forgotten souls, lost in "abysses
of affiiction," surprising in warehouselike mental hospitals, Sacks initiated
treatment with the the "miracle drug"
L-dopa (xxvii). The results, as the
book's title suggests, were nothing
short of amazing. Sacks' recounting of
the medical origins and workings of
the disease transfixes the reader
(Sacks' book was a best-seller of sorts),
but ultimately more is afoot there than
high-tech therapy and super-doctors.
For as much as Sacks is engrossed and
expert in detailing causes, symptoms,
and consequences of this puzzling
disease, his chief fascination is with
what he calls "the full needs and

Roy M. Anker teaches English at Calvin
College and unites on film and popular
culture. He is the co-author ofDancing in
the Dark: Youth, Popular Culture and
the Electronic Media, reviewed in this
issue.
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feelings of patients" and the
"landscapes of being in which these
patients reside" both of which he
deems worthy of "metaphysical
attention" (xviii, xix). After all, as
Sacks claims, it is to the patients
themselves, as individual stricken
people, and decidedly not as medical
challenges or ingenious cures, has
fallen the task, "through no fault or
wish of their own," of exploring the
unimaginable "depths, the ultimate
possibilities of being and suffering"
which life harbors (273). And in these
journeys came great ecstasies and
desolations, barely fathomable by
residents of conventional health and
"normalcy." In the end all Sacks knows
is that the usual storehouse of medical
pathologies, mechanistic in the
extreme, do not begin to account for
the wonders encountered by his crew
of sufferers.
A like sense of profound wonder
and amazement, of a "metaphysical
attention" approaching enchantment
before the mysteries and potentialities
of life, is these days finding its way
into, of all places, a few Hollywood
releases. Perhaps the most notable of
these, although maybe not the most
satisfying, is the film versions of Oliver
Sacks' book.
This past winter
appeared Meg and Lawrence Kasdan's
sober and reflective Grand Canyon.
Very much a middle-aged film, so to
speak, it scrupulously explored notions
of meaning and, believe it or not, such
terms as "miracle" in response to the
ragtag banes and blessings of ordinary
life . The effects of everyone's
psychological detritus got their due in
Bar bra Streisand 's adaptation of Pat
Conroy's Prince of Tides. Perhaps such
scenarios make good fodder for
screenplays, or the yuppies of the
nation have reached a fit age for
contemplating themselves, their
mortality, and "what it all means."
Whatever the case, the news these
filmmakers report is that, surprise, life
is an exquisite and irreplaceable gift,

so replete with meaning and delight
that its contemplation elicits nothing
so much as deep gratitude.
The trouble is that over and over
again in these films, as maybe in real
life, it takes the fearsome prospect of
death (or some close kin thereof) to
provoke even minimal apprehension
of life's inmost nature. Indeed, and
sad to say, war and sickness have
historically proven the best agents for
instigating a life-loving metaphysical
embrace. In war films, as in Oliver
Stone's Born on the Fourth of July,
dominant emphasis has usually fallen
on the horrors of war that imperil the
goodness of the ordinary. More often
we run into tales of illness and death,
no doubt because these subjects are
regular and constant, and these stories
seem to set out fuller portraits of
health, a nebulous condition whose
real benefits we fail to appreciate until
we totter on the brink of loss. If the
hard truth be known, then, it often
takes pain and death to scare life and
jubilation into us. The scary prospect
of pain and death can bring light and
gladness to spirits dark or numb, as
was the case with Tolstoy's Ivan Ilyich.
For most everyone, only the jolting
confrontation with illness and
mortality proves sufficient to alert one,
down to socks and soul, to the
inexpressible glory of ordinary human
life and love. As in the Divine Comedy,
the soul-self has to go through hell to
find life abundant. And that, to be
sure, is not a bad trip for any book, or
as we have here, two flicks derived
from books, films that really shake
people up--both on the screen and in
the seats.
The film Awakenings is, as it says
at the outset, "based on a true story,"
and as a whole it illustrates well what
Hollywood thinks it must supply to
keep an audience: namely, increase
mystery and romance so the story
looks a lot like, to put it somewhat
harshly, "the miracle worker goes on a
date" or "medical sleuth finds
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romance . " It is surely clear by the
evidence of this film that Hollywood,
that amorphous money-making crew
out in earthquake land, does not think
commonplace experience of reality of
sufficient interest to hold anyone's
attention for very long. There is in
this attitude both poverty of soul and
enormous condescension toward
ordinary people who they deem
incapable of mustering sensible
understanding of the import of their
own lives. With Awakenings, there is
some irony in this, for it offers a good
example of how far Hollywood, not
trusting its own instincts (and a lot of
other people's money), will go to dress
up a fUm whose very "message" argues
vehemently against any such approach.
Both the book and the
screenplay take us to the humble
confines of the ward for the
chronically insane at Mt. Carmel
Hospital in New York City. Here all
the heroes-to-be have been in various
stages of sleep for many years,
sometimes decades. The film follows a
withdrawn and socially inept
psychiatrist and brain researcher, Dr.
Malcolm Sayer (Robin Williams), who
seems to be some facsimile of Oliver
Sacks. The shy shrink signs on to work
in a hospital because he cannot find
laboratory work and is ill-suited for
regular "people work." To enhance
vi e wer interest still further, the
filmmakers make Sayer a brilliant
diagnostician who cracks the whole
riddle of a peculiar catatonia manifest
in a variety of patients. In fact, the sort
of knowledge he comes across in the
film had long been established, but
having Sayer come upon it makes the
whole story more dramatic(a lot like
Oliver Stone in .JFK compacting the
work of countless assassination
investigators into the oration of Jim
Garrison). However, as Sacks himself
applauds, the film does excel in its
portrait of the victims of a "postencephalitic disorder of far greater
complexity, severity, and strangeness"
than had before been imagined
possible, for while bodies fell
immobile,
minds
remained
unimpaired (xxx).
Between 1916-27 some five
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million people suffered sleeping
sickness, and some few of these
developed, often years or decades
later, acute Parkinsonianism. The
book fully details the horrible physical
consequences of the disease but is
more concerned with the victims'
experience of their own disease and
what happens under L-dopa.
Again, differing from the book
for the sake of drama, the film casts
the patients as completely unreachable
and unexpressive, and it is Sayer's
good fortune to discover a full and
remarkably sane mental life behind
their silence. After Sayer's medical
sleuthing tracks the mysterious cause,
the strange aftereffects of encephalitis,
the film begins to assume its full
measure of poignancy as Sayer
struggles to reach the healthy minds
that he alone suspects are merely
locked in a mysterious mental prison.
Firm in his hunches, he seeks his
superiors' grudging permission to
experiment with a wonder drug for
victims of Parkinson's disease, a
common neurological disorder that
destroys muscle control. He first tries
L-dopa on Leonard Lowe (Robert
DeNiro), who in the film had fallen
"asleep" in his teens and by 1969 had
been so for thirty years (actually he was
almost thirty when hospitalized and
had just about finished a doctorate in
literature at Harvard; throughout his
illness he was able to read and
communicate by indicating letters on a
small letter board).
Miraculously, in both film and
book, under the medicants of L-dopa,
Lowe emerges to full healthy
consciousness and in a short time
attains what seems to be complete
normalcy. He plunges into life with
relish, as if to make up for lost
decades. On the basis of Lowe's
recovery, Sayer wins permission to
treat others with L-dopa, and they too
blossom like long-dormant flowers
brought into the light. Amid all these
abundant miracles of recovery (again
compacted in the film), Leonard
becomes something of a prophet to
normal folks, including Malcolm
Sayer, who takes for granted much of
the grand gift of life. Leonard lives

and preaches the sheer goodness and
"wonderment" of life in ordinary
things-friends, walks, books, and
even romance.
And so do his
awakened compatriots, although they
seem to have more trouble accepting
the loss of so much of their lives and
loves. Surely these are the most
striking moments in the film, but they
pale before Leonard's exquisite savor
of being as captured in Sacks's prose:
Everything about him filled him with
delight; he was like a man who had
awoken from a nightmare or a serious
illness, or a man released from
entombment or prison, who is
suddenly intoxicated with the sense
and beauty of everything round him ...
Mr. L. was drunk on reality-on
sensations and feelings and relations
which had been cut off from him, or
distorted, for many decades. ... He
read the "Paradiso" now~uring the
previous twenty years he had never got
beyond "Inferno" or "Purgatorio"with tears of joy on his face; "I feel
saved," he would say, "resurrected, reborn. I feel a sense of health
amounting to Grace ... I feel like a man
in love." ... [the] diary which he started
to keep at the time was full of
expressions of amazement and
gratitude. (208-09)
Words, it seems, venture only so
far, and while the film evokes the
same, it hoards cinema's resources in
evoking Leonard's new life, however
brief it proved to be. While its
portrayal is moving, director Penny
Marshall's rendition of Leonard's newfound ecstasy of being is sadly very
tame. The screenplay and the director
might have presented far more of
Leonard's radical embrace of the
gladness of ordinary being. In any
case, the tale progresses, and for
Leonard and the others, the new
bright flame of being flickered and
then very painfully ebbed as the drug
lost its potency. After two weeks on Ldopa, Leonard began to suffer
countless side-effects from the drug.
These calamities ranged from assorted
torturous body spasms to paranoia and
all-consuming lust, the latter two
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psychological distresses entirely
neglected by the film. For these
reasons, Leonard would eventually opt
to eschew further experimentation
with wonder drugs. Having had his fill
of glory and misery, he would, so to
speak, live quietly.
Awalrenings sets forth its portrait
of human interconnectedness very
nicely. As chronicled by Sacks in an
appendix to the 1990 edition of his
book, Robert De Niro mastered, with
scholarly persistence and acumen, the
demanding role of Leonard, and
Robin Williams managed to submerge
his effervescent lunacy into the shy
physician. The story moves nicely,
although it feels contrived as the
movie makers labor to imbue the tale
with, as Sacks describes it in his book,
"the emotion, the excitement, and
with something akin to enchantment,
even awe" that it possessed in real life.
Those who have read the remarkable
original account by psychiatrist-writer
Oliver Sacks, the model for Sayer, will
no doubt be disappointed not with the
film's desire to capture this mood but
with the irksome predictability of its
sentimental strategies (overdone
music and photography, to name two).
Nonetheless, this quiet film sets
forth a remarkable story, and on top of
that, dares to tell audiences, albeit
tamely, what that story might mean.
That is, we should care for one
another, even when impractical; that
life comes full of surprises; and that
life was meant to be something good
and grand, full of relish, delight, and
gratitude. Admittedly, this implausible
scenario resembles the sort of fanciful
stuff that comes in fairy tales.
Nonetheless, contends Sacks, "real
life" at times does hold real surprises,
sad and glorious ones alike. The
marvel of Awakenings as film and book,
especially the latter, is that the story
amply captures both the tragedy and
healing that together spell the life of
the human spirit on this globe. In this
we can take hope: As Sayer says to a
group of visitors at the film's end,
there is in each human self a "spirit,"
and no disease or chemical can
extinguish its desperate will to live and
walk whole in the sunshine.
May 1992

If the film of Awakenings makes
less of, tames and diminishes, its
source material, The Doctor makes
much more of its somewhat meager
source, a 1988 medical memoir by
Edward Rosenbaum (originally titled A
Taste of My Oum Medicine). In the film,
a middle-aged cardiac surgeon, a
quick-cut hotshot, gets a sore throat
that turns out to be cancer. Expert,
elegant, and successful (quite the
opposite from Malcolm Sayer), Dr.
Jack MacKee (the splendid William
Hurt) loves his profession, and himself
in it, singing and bantering with his
cohorts during surgery. At first, the
viewer cannot exactly tell whether
Jack's
infectious
demeanorhandsome, charming, jaunty, and
witty--sterns from love of life or from
arrogance. On one hand, he knows he
has the good life, at least
contemporary America's version of it,
and he seems downright determined
to enjoy it. On the other hand, he
thinks he deserves it because he knows
he is good at what he does. A nagging
cough brings him to a colleague, who
coolly drops news of a growth on his
vocal chords. While radiation therapy
cures most such lesions, the chance
remains that this one might require a
dangerous surgery that could, even if
successful, leave him voiceless. Worse
still, there is the prospect, however
slight, that nothing will work and that
this, indeed, is the beginning of the
end.
The invincible healer becomes a
patient, and he does not like it very
much. It is only in this regard that the
film takes its inspiration from the
book. While very scary, the disease is
hardly the problem. Just as bad,
seemingly, is the indignity of being a
patient. Once god-like atop his
medical Olympus, MacKee now suffers
hospital waiting rooms and colleagues'
often rude indifference. In short,
finitude confronts MacKee in more
ways than one. Much to its praise, and
faithful to the Rosenbaum memoir,
the film effectively hauls us through
the series of emotional and physical
shocks that being a patient entails.
Symbolic of this complete assault is an
enema mistakenly administered to

MacKee, and he cannot talk to fend
off the medical swat-team that invades
his room. Mildly funny in the film, a
last humiliation for the once-arrogant
doctor, the event parallels increased
emotional vulnerability. The decline
in power culminates when Jack finds
that radiation treatments have not
worked, and he now faces perilous
surgery. Assailed by disease, sick unto
death physically and emotionally, fast
Jack does not know what to do with
himself. And it is here that the film
begins to supply depths of soulsearching and contemplation that are
entirely lacking in the source.
Either out of habit or simple
pride, the insular, self-glorying doctor
cannot turn to his long-suffering wife,
whom he has kept at a cordial arm's
length. Nor does his long-ignored
pubescent son offer much hope for
solace. Into this self-made void comes
another patient, one facing certain
doom from inoperable brain cancer.
Predictably, the helper is an attractive
young woman (don't the old or other
males have anything credible to say to
confused young men?). Appropriately
named June, a seasonal token of new
life, she shows Jack the way to relish
and intimacy (we can at least be
thankful that this message is imparted
without the complications of romance,
although they flirt with the idea of
flirtation). Some reviewers have found
the June subplot cheap corn, but it
does allow for fine images of how life
should indeed be lived, images that
assert that life is a gift to be savored
rather than frittered or ego-tripped.
Indeed, as the plot suggests, for awhile
before her death, June becomes a kind
of angel who flits into Jack's life before
disappearing.
For her, as one
gorgeous shot argues, life is a dance
that hears music from deep within the
inmost recesses of being. After such
news, Jack sets out to fix a lot of bad
things in his life: bedside demeanor,
colleagues, marriage, medical
education, and so on. The point is
that his frailty, and the grace of June,
have taught him how to feel and love.
And so happily ends the film.
To be sure, the central plot
device in these two films is a cliche-at
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least, of sorts. Loss and ill-health sober
the soul enough to contemplate the
sheer sensate and relational goodness
of ordinary life, the irreplaceable good
gift and wonderment of being alive.
Very often, it seems, only the grim
prospect of losing everything prods
well-encased souls to love the least
anything. And then, too, sometimes
the best gifts come when and where we
least expect them. Staring at death
and oblivion, all that we take for
granted and seldom pause to relish
becomes new and fresh-suddenly of
vital importance. That sort of hardwon recognition is as old as Odysseus
and Joseph, and in the late nineteenth
century Tolstoy rendered its classic
formulation in the harrowing Death of
Ivan Ilyich, a starkly rich tale of
terminal illness and new life. Like the
assorted characters in these films, most
everybody languishes for lack of some
firm realism about the costs and gifts
of life, death, and sleepwalking. The
prospect of mortality can, by God's
good grace, prove an ultimate tonic
for being, awakening one and all into
fervent delight in the majesty of
human life.O

At the Shark Tank
We press our faces
to the glass, shudder
under a thread rotted jaw.
Pickets of teeth skim
close as an embrace.
No longer lovers, we deny
an end, hover in the impotent
solace of friendship. I fall prey
to a lidless stare, opaque
as milk, an ancient angry mind
too blank for peace.
I understand the ache
for devourance
and escape, a longing
to shatter the glass
between us. Sharks will thrash
in ecstasy at our feet
and I will reach
to gash my palm
on smooth grey shards
of steel. Still
no climax, just sinister blue
fluctuations on your cheek.
The ocean floor
must be much darker,
only the forward fluid motion
of gills, slits into the body
wide enough for a hand,
and the slow ceaseless longing
for sleep.

Barbara Fischer
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Hospitality With An
Attitude
Maureen Jais-Mick
I had just received communion
and was prayerfully turning toward my
seat when the usher hissed, "Stay right
there." I froze. Immediately, my
transgression was revealed - in this
church one waits to be dismissed from
the Lord's Supper.
I'm Maureen-a recovering
liturgist/church musician who's spent
years in Lutheran settings. I've
planned convention worship and
directed worship committees. I've told
clergy where to stand, when to move,
what to wear and where to go. If
anyone knows her way around the
liturgy, it's me. However, after I
retired from the organist-choirmaster
biz and began worshipping in different
places, I began to analyze feeling
welcome at worship.
I didn't know there were so many
ways to distribute communionindividual glasses already filled (the
red, white or purple stuff is grape
juice), individual glasses to be filled
(too late! I was supposed to pick up a
glass on the way to the railing),
common cup. (But wait! do you take it
and serve yourself or does the nervous
lay assistant aim for your mouth?)
Where does the little glass go when
I'm done? Swallow the bread
Maureen Jais-Mick has worked for many
years as a Lutheran church musician in the
Washington, D. C. area. She is presently
devoting herself to business administration,
with occasional lapses into column writing.
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immediately or retain it for intinction?
Consume the elements as they're
received or wait for a signal? Kneeling
or standing? Line communion or
some elaborate formation known only
to lifelong members? And, of course,
the one I flunked: Take communion
and leave or wait to be dismissed?
Being a visitor has cured me of sitting
in the front rows-a relief to my
husband. In all fairness, I wasn't doing
too well that morning before
distribution, either. Sitting in a
forward pew, I had boldly stood for the
hymns-only to discover that this
congregation always sits.
I like the infrastructure of liturgy
-the underlying order-and the way
one part flows predictably into the
next. I like clouds of incense, splendid
vestments, paraments and banners,
stained glass, metalwork, sculpture,
lively acoustics, substantial preaching,
enthusiastic singing, pipe organs and
instruments. I like gospel Masses with
electric bass, percussion and
synthesizer,
outdoor worship,
traditional folk music, foreign tongues,
and a cappella congregational singing.
I like children's sermons aimed at kids,
not designed as cuteness breaks for
adults. I appreciate the potential for
hospitality in all of the above.
The best things about liturgical
form are (I) you know what to expect
next, and (2) there is flexibility,
especially with a resource like Lutheran
Boolr. of Worship. Both predictability and
flexibility are necessary for hospitality.
People who know what is expected of
them are more comfortable in any
situation, but people who repeat the
same actions over and over again
become automatons.

My favorite model for liturgical
hospitality is entertaining in the home.
When guests arrive, we don't greet
them and then wander back to what
we were doing beforehand-leaving
them to wonder what happens next.
Even as children, we weren't excused
from being hosts. We introduced
ourselves, we fetched refreshments, we
made "adult" conversation, and we
helped our folks. We learned our
families' traditions of hospitality by
performing them. But since, as adults,
we know these traditions thoroughly,
we are also free to shape them to fit a
situation or event.
Hospitality has certain partsrites, if you will-a thorough
housecleaning, floral decorations,
special refreshments and foods,
introduction of the guests to all
present, directions for where to sit and
how to serve, and conversations that
include everyone. We are not casual
about hospitality in our home,
although we are definitely informal.
So spare me another sermon
likening the Eucharist to a magnificent
wedding feast. You show me the
pastor, musician and worship
committee who put as much effort
into worship as my family does into a
wedding and I 'II show you a parish
that's turning members away. At family
weddings, no member is exempt from
playing host. We all keep an eye on the
caterer, the bar, the band, and
especially anyone who's being left out
of the merrymaking. Strangers often
get more attention than old friends on
these occasions because they need
more. We're delighted they came. It's
as simple as that.
Contrary to what you've heard,
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Lutheran liturgy isn't intrinsically
inhospitable-as in, "Lutheran liturgy
is too complicated for visitors. They
get confused." Or, "Our services are
too difficult for the people who live in
the neighborhood (i.e., Blacks,
Hispanics, Asians, etc.). That's why
they don't come. And our services are
too long." Ah, yes, let us never cease to
be concerned for the unfortunate,
attention-deficit disordered minorities
surrounding our urban churches.
What a challenge they are to
evangelize. Why some of these people
are arriving at other churches before 9
a.m. and not leaving until past 2 p.m.
is, like Lutheran liturgy, "too
complicated."
I recall the African American
rector of an Episcopal church in
Kansas City commenting on those
trying to evangelize his parish
neighborhood (this was the 1970s).
He couldn't understand why they
jettisoned the interesting stuffchant, incense, chasubles, etc. His
parishioners relished the sounds, the
textures and sweet odors, the beauty
and the colors. Who wouldn't? They
also enthusiastically introduced their
own traditions into the worship. For
them, it wasn't a choice between being
African
American
or
being
Episcopalian, but a melding of many
things beautiful and worshipful. The
Mass has survived for a long time in
many places among many peoples. It
won't break if handled. Making it a
reflection of the parish and the whole
church can only strengthen it.
The question in 1992 is not,
"Should we culturally adapt the
liturgy?" but "Where do we start?" For
me, it is natural to begin with the arts.
Here in Washington, D.C., if one walks
down 16th or 14th Streets as church
lets out, one can enjoy sartorial
splendor and a love of liturgical
costume without even entering the
church buildings. On warm Sundays,
the choirs are exotic combinations of
purple, red, electric blue and green.
The pastor of a local Pentecostal
congregation garbs himself all in papal
white-cassock, cape, biretta and
shoes. He may be only a storefront
preacher, but in his heart he and John
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Paul II are the shepherds of their
flocks and dress the part.
Adaptation of the liturgy is good
news for musicians, artists and all who
value culture. It implies a knowledge
of culture(s), which means that some
hard work and study has gone into the
process-surely more thought than
repeating what we've always done.
Someone commented to me that "If
rap is what's happening, then rap
belongs in church." Okay by me. How?
Where? Give me some practical
training. I've tried and tried and still
cannot form my mouth to correctly
produce those staccato, percussive
sounds into the microphone. I'd also
welcome some powerful contemporary
texts, although I've got enough to get
started-compliments of the Watts
Man, Senor Long-and-Common Meter,
Mister Rap Hymnody, a poet defmitely
too legit to quit-Isaac Watts (16741748). In fact, let's rise and rap
together right now. Take a moment to
get the beat going (accented syllables
italicized) :
Joy

to

the world, the Lord is come!

Let earth receive its King

(choir: He's the King!)
Let ev'ry heart pre pan him room

And heav'n and nature sing
(choir: He's the King!)
And heav'n and nature sing
(choir: He's the King!)
"Yo, Paul [Manz]," calls the head
usher. "What kind of moves with the
Doxology at the 11:00 service?"
Praise God from whom all blessings flow,
Praise him, all creatures here be low.
Praise him above, ye heav'nly hosts,
Praise Father, Son and Holy Ghost.
Practically speaking, rapping the
Doxology solves the last line "What
rhythm do you use?" dilemma.
An offertory procession with an
attitude, that's what we'd have. But
shouldn't all sacred song have an
attitude? It's what Paul Manz, John
Ferguson and a growing number of my
colleagues bring to hymnody and why
people are energized singing with
them. Vestments and stained glass

need attitude, too. A project
unfortunately left undone when I gave
up directing the Worship & Liturgical
Arts Committee of the Washington
Synod (ELCA) was commissioning a
set of vestments for the bishop. After
being moved to amazement by the
Afrocentric textiles ofJanuar Umoja at
The Smithsonian, it suddenly hit me
that my committee's task wasn't to
order some vestments. Our task was to
take full advantage of six opportunities
(blue, purple, white/gold, red, green
and a cope) to celebrate our peopleAsians, Europeans, Africans, Spanishspeaking, Native American-our
Lutheranism, and our region.
If hospitality is about making
people welcome, we have to look at
our architecture and art. Look around
you. Ever get the feeling everybody in
the Bible was fair-skinned? Isn't Israel
near Jordan and Egypt? Didn'tJesus
travel from place to place in the hot
sun of the Middle East? Our parishes
need more art-a continuous stream
of it. I know you installed that statue
when the building was dedicated 75
years ago. It's very nice, but even the
National Gallery changes its displays
and, trust me, it's got better stuff than
your church. Most likely, your
members don't really notice it
anymore. But visitors read your
building's message. I certainly notice
who's included and who's excluded as
I visit to worship. What has your parish
commissioned lately? Or did you
consider the decorating finished for all
time once the last stained glass window
was installed?
The parish at which I failed
communion didn't plan to be
inhospitable. The people in charge
just forgot what it's like to be the
outsider. Like many people, I'm on
edge in a strange environment. The
worship folder should help, but I've
also discovered that most bulletins are
not designed for those who need
them. As it was recently explained to
me, in my capacity as guest organist, by
a patient church secretary, "If we
include the information you want in
the bulletin, the order of service will
take up more than one page." Alert
the media.
The Cnsset

But, as a former church secretary
who scored "highly entrepreneurial"
on some trendy 1980s personality test,
I propose the User-Friendly Worship
Folder. Here's the idea-free of charge.
Anybody can come to church and be
handed the regular bulletin. However,
for an additional $5 participants can
purchase a worship folder containing
brief notes about the day's
significance, complete music titles and
composers' names, anthem texts and
translations, names of all service
participants, and directions for
communion distribution. Parts of the
service are identified-Confession and
Forgiveness, Service of the Word,
Service of Holy Communion, etc. All
staff names, titles and office hours are
printed. Ditto committee directors
and times of regularly scheduled
committee meetings. Organizations
are identified by full name, followed
by a concise blurb about their
purpose. (This is 1992. It's okay to
explain what Lutherans Concerned is
concerned about.) "The WELCA
invite all members to ... " is about as
helpful to a visitor or new member as
my all-time favorite, "See Bob after
church if you want to contribute to
this year's .... "And it's all wrapped in
a piece of cover art worth saving. I may
have to up the price to $6.50, but I'm
confident that people will buy it.O

David L. Burrows. Sound, Speech, and
Music. Amherst: The University of
Massachusetts Press, 1990. 138 pp.
$22.50.
David Burrows would have us
consider an "unconsidered ubiquity."
While most people exist in their sonic
environment without much thought,
beyond the occasional outcry "fum that
music down!" or "Can't you speak up?"
Burrows writes from his dozen or so years
of speculative thought about soundhow is it in our experience?-what
information power does it have in
human development? why do we use it to
define and extend ourselves?-and
proposes a bold thesis:
" •••the distinctiveness of human beings as
a species .•. is to a great extent an
outgrowth of the distinctiveness of the

way they UBe sound. •••"
Burrows calls his compact little
book a "phenomenology of sound,
speech, thought and music." Though he
admits a beginning in his academic
discipline, he argues that a quest for the
ontology of music leads inevitably to
roots where sonic implementation
includes also that which we usually call
speech. So this is not a musicological
essay, but rather a systematicsphilosophical, psychological, biological,
and often poetical- that centers on the
living human body, itself a center that
tends to treat everything outside itself as
peripheral and dependent.
This systematics of the human uses
of sound proceeds itself in a systematic,
May 1992

logical way. The seven chapters are
named: SOUND, VOICE, WORDS,
WORDS AND MUSIC, WORDS IN
MUSIC,
WORDS
ON MUSIC,
INSTURMENTAUTIES.
The human eye sees in straight
lines; we are visually unconnected with
things behind us or when we shut our
eyes. Sound, however, though it may
have slight directional qualities,
surrounds us like the ocean of air in
which we live. We are hard put to shut
out sounds that intrude upon our privacy
and we employ this sonic ubiquity to our
purposes when we send out ourselves as
sound waves to engulf, to "en-<>eean" the
others among whom we live. "The self is
the other than other." (4)
Our voice comes from within our
self, deep from within, from that which
we
sense
physiologically and
psychologically as our center. The
unborn child hears sounds but waits to
make sounds until birth. With the
exhalation that follows upon the first
intake of air, the child defines itself as a
center among others. Humans learn
soon after this in tializing of self to
control and articulate exhaustion of air
from the body with larynx, tongue, lips,
and teeth. The waste product of
respiration becomes that which
empowers the self to reach out to other
bodies.
Words-here Burrows considers
only oral phonation-are the efficient
means humans have developed to leave
the bodily center of beingness and take
up residence in that freedom from other
beings in this incorporeal realm that
identifies the human species. Words
quickly and precisely transfer ideas from
one mind to another and, probably,
ideas or thoughts are structured by
sound in the process of phonation.
Burrows calls speech "post-laryngeal
phonation." Sounds produced "prelaryngeally" are from deeper within
ourselves, again physiologically as well as
psychologically. It is to this "seat of
innocence" that we return when we
make sounds into that human
phenomenon called music. Music and
speech are inseparable through
separately locatable.
When words and music coexist, as
in a song, the tensions between
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experience and innocence, articulated
thought and non-verbal feeling are
palpable. The composer and the poet
live in an uneasy marriage. (Burrows'
study at this point of Purcell's "Musick for
a while shall all our cares beguile" is
almost as lovely as the song.)
Even more uneasy is the coming
together of words about music. The
attempt to explain in the manner of postlaryngeal articulation the meaning of prelaryngeal utterance must fail. Even more
so the setting down in graphics of that
which is not visual. Printed words cannot
capture music and notational symbols
can never be the sounds.
Burrows implies that the urge to
expand beyond our own center the
experience of music making which leads
us to attempt musical notation is not
unrelated to the urge which leads human
beings to invent musical instruments.
These devices and machines for
producing sounds are closer or farther
from our musical centers (compare oboe
and piano), but almost always the
instrumentalist imagines sounds
produced by the body to be closer to the
ideal. The violinist emulates the phrasing
of a singer and senses her instrument as
her own body.
What then of the drummer? Or,
how does one explain the self-expression
of the hot-rodder dragging on Main
Street? Where in this systematics is
dance, that realization of the self's center
in physical movement? How shall we
deal with those collisions of selfexpanding sounds that we daily
encounter: talking during a concert,
radio sounds thwarting conversational
ambitions, irreverent sounds in a holy
silence? It would be asking more of this
book than it intends. Burrows has
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chosen not to include any study of
extraneous sounds in our environment;
we can hope, though , that his speculative
thought will take up the fact that our
technological accomplishments have
been always accompanied by increases in
accidental sonic experiences. Burrows
has given us some ways of understanding
what it is we do in our mostly
"unconsidered ubiquity." With his
leadership-he claims no particular
originality and cites generously others
who are similarly considering their sonic
environment--each of us can have a go
at understanding the other-than-other
which is ourselves as well as the others
too.
The area in Burrows' study that
seems to me most promising of fruition is
one he only slightly indicates. At the
beginning he posits three fields in which
centripetal I centrifugal action of the self
happens. Each field has an associated
topology, a configuration that defines the
action possible in that field. Field one is
physical space (the body); Field two is
where thought takes place (the mind);
Field three is the diffusion of sense-of-self
"through the full range of awareness."
Field three he identifies as the "field of
the spirit" though he is quick to require
that we understand "spirit" in a "not
primarily theological way." Nevertheless,
musicians (and I here include listeners
along with makers) who have a care for
the practice of music in our spiritual life
together may wish to join me in a quest to
know better how sound enables us in the
topologies of Field three.
Let Burrows' last paragraph lead
on:
Sound shaped into music is perhaps the
most direct way into Field three, and Field
three is a way out of one and two and the
strains within and between them. Field
three forgives mereness and mortality.
Action here turns back on itself and
converges on stasis. When Field three is
fully realized, there can be no friction
between part and part, part and whole-there are no parts, and so no particulars,
and no partiality. There is no possible
disorientation, for there is only one
possible orientation, and that is to be one
with the whole.

W. F. Eifrig

Quentin J.
Schultze
(Project
Coordinator), Roy M. Anker (Project
Editor}, James D. Bratt, William D.
Romanowski, John William Worst, and
Lambert Zuidervaart Dancing in the Darlt:
Youth, Popular Culture, and the Electronic
Media. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991.
348 pp. $14.95.
This ambitious book, authored by
six scholars, surveys and analyzes the
relationships between youth, popular
culture and the electronic media. A
usual means of editing such a book
would be to include essays written by and
attributed to individual scholars; the
editor would supply the introduction and
show how the essays contribute to the
overall theme. This book is put together
differently, however; the whole is
presented as the work of all six through
corporate attribution, with Quentin].
Schultze listed as Project Coordinator
and Roy M. Anker as Project Editor.
Dancing in the Darlr. is the result of
eleven months of group study at the
Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship.
Although the authors all are Calvin
College professors and share a Reformed
Christian perspective (and, as they admit,
that of white, middle-aged, North
American males), differences in point of
view appear in the text This can be seen
as a strength of the book, since it mirrors
the complexity of the issues. Dancing in
the Darlr. is always careful not to make easy,
dismissive pronouncements about the
worth of any element of popular culture
or its effects on youth or the broader
society. Individual chapters offer
informative and perceptive analyses of
the nature and history of rock and roll,
MTV, movies, and television and their
social and personal effects. In spite of
occasional inconsistencies in point of
view, the book as a whole serves as an
excellent overview of North American
popular culture, the entertainment
industry, and their relationship to youth.
Overall, the authors warn us that
contemporary electronic culture, while
having beneficial effects, may also be
doing much harm.
Chapters on the general electronic
media concentrate on their sociological
effects. The authors claim that the
entertainment industry promotes
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generational separateness to more
successfully tap the lucrative youth
market. The programming offered
encourages long-term immaturity by
emphasizing adolescent versions of
identity and intimacy, promotes
consumption as a means to happiness,
discourages historical perspective, and
substitutes passive entertainment for
active participation in the world. Youth
depend on the electronic media to gain
a (superficial) sense of generational
commonality, and the entertainment
industry promotes this identification to
maintain its economic bonanza.
While sending clear warning
signals about negative effects of positive
art, the authors also maintain the
importance of our taking it seriously. In
a chapter on evaluating popular art, the
authors attack an elitism which draws
rigid (and often unjustified) qualitative
distinctions between high art and
popular art, and segregates the high arts
from their social context through the
promotion of the pure formal study of
the art form. The authors promote what
they call "contextualism," the idea that
how "art is produced and how it
functions in life and society are crucial
for deciding its goodness" (286).
The book also offers chapters on
individual media. Among the best are
those on rock music and Music
Television (MTV), though here the
reader gets differing perspectives. The
excellent chapter on rock music seems to
have been written by someone
sympathetic to the genre. It carefully
describes both the art and the business,
the constructive and the destructive, and
concludes that rock music "mirrors the
contradictions present in contemporary
life" and "celebrates life and freedom but
also wallows in self-indulgence and
despair" and ultimately "heals but ... also
hurts" (176). In contrast, the equally
persuasive chapter on MTV sees the
network and its effects as an unmitigated
social disaster. MTV, the authors claim,
offers only the non-stop promotion of
consumption and fabricated intimacy,
and constitutes "one of the most
powerful forms of contemporary
propaganda" (204).
Dancing in the Dark is well-written
and eclectic-packed with provocative
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analyses and ideas. In point of view it
sometimes wavers. It often seems to
claim that popular culture and the
electronic media have apocalyptic
negative effects for youth and society.
Elsewhere it implies that the today's socalled "youth crisis" is simply the latest
manifestation of the age-old problems of
adolescence and that the media can help
as well as hinder the process of maturing.
But this tension is quite healthy; the
issues here are so complicated that none
of us can claim to have settled them once
and for all.

Carl Plantinga

Robert Kolb. Confessing the Faith:
Reformers Define the Church, 1530-1580.
Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1991. 184 pp. Paper. $14.95.
Kolb's research into the
Reformation era's middle and later
stages continues to sparkle with
freshness of information and clarity of
presentation. The present volume, in
Concordia's "Scholarship Today"
series, is no exception. Kolb gathers a
wealth of data not otherwise available
to non-specialists in order to show
what those involved m
the
Reformation movement in northern
Germany in the middle decades of the
sixteenth century thought about their
act of confession at Augsburg in 1530.
Key is Kolb's argument that
theologians at mid-century reflected
on the document which came to enjoy
formal standing in their midst. The
chapters in which Kolb presents his
summaries of this information are the
heart of the argument and are
absolutely first-rate.
The constraints of the series, on
the other hand, seem to force the
impressively-presented data into the
service of an alternative agendasignalled by the banishing of the rich
documentation to the position of
endnotes rather than footnotes, and
by the appending of a series of
"Reflection Questions" (unsigned, but
evidently not Kolb's work) whose
intent is indicated in their
introductory paragraph:
"for

understanding religion, confessionalism,
and
present-day
implications and applications."
Despite this ambiguity of
purpose, the book contains thoughtful
reflections in which Kolb challenges
his readers: "It is impossible to live in
the spirit of Augsburg and not be
determinedly ecumenical (137)" or
"the articles or topics of the faith (as
found, for example, in the Augsburg
Confession) are not so many equally
valuable pearls on a string, with so
m_a ny required to make the string a
necklace and so many dispensible.
Instead, [Luther and Melanchthon]
believed that Biblical teaching is like a
human body. Christ is its head;
decapitated it dies" (136). Such
assertions, grounded in a rich fare of
documentation, will reward the
thoughtful reader.
David M. Truemper

Notes on Poets:
Barbara Bazyn lives in Chelsea, Iowa,
where she is a freelance writer. Her
poem, "The White Ideal Sea"
appeared in the December 1991 issue
of The Cresset.
Gary Fincke teaches at Susquehanna
University and publishes often in The
Cresset. In March, his poem "Inventing
Angels" appeared in Harper's.
Barbara Fischer works with the writers'
program at Johns Hopkins University.
This is her first appearance in The
Cresset.
Fritz Fritsche} sent us this poem some
time ago. If he sees this, we hope he
will let us know where he is.
J.T. Ledbetter, a poet whose work
appears frequently in The Cresset,
teaches at California Lutheran
University.
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